A Decade for the Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon: How Much Has Changed?

By Yaniv Voller

Ten years ago, in May 2000, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) withdrew from Lebanon after almost two decades of military control over South Lebanon and ended direct political interference in Lebanese political affairs.

The IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon, popularly described as Israel’s Vietnam, was perceived by commentators to bring a radical change to the region’s geopolitics. Some, particularly in Israel and outside of the Middle East, saw the withdrawal as yet another phase in the ongoing peace agreements between Israel and its neighbours and a necessary step toward a comprehensive peace agreement with Lebanon. But those remained a minority amidst sceptics on both the Israeli and the Arab side.

For many in Israel, and particularly those in the military circles and the right wing parties, the withdrawal meant the loss of Israel’s deterrent force vis-à-vis its enemies in the region. The combination of the withdrawals’ hasty and chaotic nature, the fact that it was done overnight and two months before the planned withdrawal date in order to surprise Hezbollah and to avoid Israeli casualties (perhaps the only success of the withdrawal), and the abrupt collapse of Israel’s long-time proxy, the South Lebanese Army, all served to further the beliefs Israelis who viewed the withdrawal as a colossal defeat. Retired senior officers, commentators and MPs predicted that soon Hezbollah, the Palestinians and the Syrians would use the opportunity to attack Israel in its weakness. They also predicted that South Lebanon would soon become a front between Israel and Iran –the state now free to position its armed forces in “Hezbollah-land.” Those who warned against the withdrawal were further vindicated when the Second Intifada erupted in the occupied territories less than four months after the withdrawal, Hezbollah kidnapped three Israeli soldiers and attacked Israel (marking the beginning of the summer 2006 war).

On the other hand, Arab commentators saw the IDF withdrawal as a cosmetic operation which provided an excuse for Israel to use excessive force against its enemies and an opportunity to dodge a peace agreement with Syria and the Palestinians. Indeed, for these commentators as well, the Israeli operations in Lebanon in 2006 and in Gaza in 2008 were perceived as an Israeli effort to regain its deterrent power.

Yet, a brief review of the last decade reveals that, at least in the short term, the withdrawal has had no significant implications on regional geopolitics. In fact, most regional developments perceived as a direct outcome of the withdrawal are better attributed to internal state dynamics rather than changes due to the withdrawal. Firstly, when it comes to deterrent power, Israel still acts as a regional superpower – yet it cannot handle guerrilla fighting and popular uprising, as evidenced by the Palestinian Intifadas or Hezbollah’s guerrilla attacks. In other words, Israel began losing its deterrent power before the withdrawal, when it proved incapable of containing the first Palestinian Intifada or preventing Hezbollah from shelling Israeli border towns. The Second Palestinian Intifada, erupted not because of Israel’s loss of deterrent power – but because the Palestinians realised that Israel could not be defeated militarily or by diplomatic means – as happened in the First Intifada. Hezbollah’s attacks on Israel indicate an improvement in Hezbollah’s capabilities more than they indicate greater boldness from its side. These attacks served those within Israel who argued that the withdrawal would lead to Hezbollah’s strengthening – but such an argument means ignoring the fact that Israel never controlled the whole of Lebanon – and that Hezbollah could obtain and store weapons in other parts of Lebanon. Finally, Israel’s withdrawal indeed brought with it some immediate political gains for Hezbollah including widespread support in Arab public opinion as the first Arab force to defeat Israel. Yet, even this achievement has been eroded as Hezbollah has been increasingly perceived by large segments of the Arab public as an Iranian proxy in an Arab state.

On the other hand, the withdrawal did not change much in Israel’s regional security conception. The IDF may have learned tactical lessons from the withdrawal, but Israel’s defense policies remain the same. Israel’s attacks on Lebanon and the Gaza strip, though devastating, reflect some rational calculation and some consideration of international public opinion, rather than being only a desperate move to regain deterrence power (here it should be clear that albeit being utterly destructive, both offences in Lebanon and Gaza, the IDF did not use its full military capabilities).

Hence, whereas Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 had a dramatic impact on the geopolitics of the region, its withdrawal from Lebanon seems to have had an effect mainly within Israel and Lebanon. Of course, time may unfold further implications of this action – but at least for now it seems as though it has been overestimated.

Yaniv Voller is a second year PhD student at the London School of Economics and is interested in secessionism, legitimacy and recognition, non-state actors, Iraq, and Turkey. He is also a graduate teaching assistant in the International History department at the LSE.

Shifting Sands is the blog of the Middle East International Affairs Programme at LSE IDEAS, analysing current events in the Middle East and contributing to the ongoing deliberations over policy prescriptions.

Amber Holewinski, Editor

On the (supposedly) sensational documents from the Gorbachev Foundation Archives

Some of the readers of this blog may have heard of one Pavel Stroilov. Over the last year or so he has gotten quite a bit of attention from the main stream press. He claims to be sitting on a treasure trove of archival documents from the Gorbachev federation, which he stole by manipulating the computer system there. He claims, further, that these documents have been unavailable to other researchers, and that they reveal a dark side to Gorbachev. His story has gotten another retelling in a recent article in the Spring 2010 issue of City Journal, outlet of the conservative Manhattan Institute.

The article (read it here: http://www.city-journal.org/2010/20_2_soviet-archives.html) is full of factual errors, but this being a blog for Cold War historians, I will just focus on the issue of the documents.

According to the article, Stroilov has 50,000 documents on his computer. He claims that these are unavailable to researchers, a claim that the article repeats. In fact, the vast majority of these documents have been available to researchers for at least the past decade. I worked in the Gorbachev Foundation Archives (GFA) in 2006, 2007, and 2008, and was able to see the available notes taken at Politburo meetings, Chernaiev’s diary, various papers written by Gorbachev aides, and some memorandums of meetings and telephone conversations (memcons) between Gorbachev and foreign leaders. The only time documents were withdrawn was when they were being prepared for publication by the GFA; even then, after explaining that I was working on a PhD thesis and did not want to spend my entire life in grad school, I was given access to the documents. The one exception is some of the memcons of conversations with foreign leaders – for reasons that are not quite clear, many of these were kept from researchers. Even the memcons, though, have been included in the excellent volumes the GFA has been releasing over the past several years, including one on the German question, several editions of the Politburo notes, and a series approaching 15 volumes of what seems to be the GFAs entire collection. Cherniaev’s diary, one of the treasures of the GFA’s collection, has also been published.

Nor is it true that there has been no interest in these documents in the West, a point Ms. Berlinski raises apparently to show that we are all in danger of slipping into communism. On the contrary, many of them have been not only utilized by scholars but translated and published in English, particularly by the Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archive. This includes the supposed shockingly revelatory memcon of Gorbachev’s meeting with Thatcher that the Times acquired from Mr. Stroilov – you can read the NSA’s translation here: http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB293/index.htm
The Chernaiev diary is up on the NSA site as well; NSA staff have been translating the entries year by year.

But let’s assume for a moment that Stroilov did steal a batch of fascinating documents otherwise unavailable to researchers. Would this be a reason for historians to celebrate? Absolutely not. Working in Russian archives is challenging and often frustrating; documents are either not made available to researchers; all too often, documents that were once available are withdrawn. One reason is that a truly open archival culture has not taken hold; another is that there is still suspicion of researchers using the materials for embarrassing revelations about the past, which could in turn cause problems for the archivist responsible. On top of that, there is a deep-seeded paranoia about the documents being stolen by researchers who will sell them abroad. And yet an enormous amount has indeed become available, and the fields of Soviet/Russian history and Cold War history have been transformed as a result. Mr. Stroilov’s theft of the documents is not only objectively wrong(it is theft, after all), it plays on all the fears and insecurities of Russian officials and archivists. At a time when Russia has a president who has spoken in favour of archival access, Mr. Stroilov’s act will only serve to support the arguments of those who want to keep the archive closed.

See also the excellent response on http://www.russian-front.com/ and by Ron Radosh at pajamasmedia. Note Radosh’s conclusion: “The only scandal is why City Journal, one of the most important and distinguished journals in the United States, printed such a weak and misleading article that is far below its usual quality.” I would disagree with the part about City Journal being among the most important journals in the United States, but I don't see why any serious publication would print an article whose author clearly did absolutely no background work, and used a story about the theft of archival documents to push an ideological agenda.

On another note, my colleague Svetlana Savranskaya informs me that she and Sergei Radchenko (until recently of the LSE, now at University of Nottingham) wrote a response to the Times back in September; their letter was never published. I will post the letter here later…

Presidential Landslide Victory in Milestone Philipine Elections

The May 10th general elections marked a milestone for democracy in the Philippines. Front-runner presidential candidate Benigno ‘Noynoy’ Aquino has won a landslide victory, thus setting the stage for an orderly transition of power from incumbent president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Overall, the successful introduction of a computerised vote-counting system allowed for election results to be reported with unprecedented speed and credibility.

With more than 80,000 candidates contesting some 17,000 elected offices, including the vice-presidency, half the Senate, the entire House or Representatives, and local provincial and municipal positions (governor, vice-governor, board members, mayor, vice mayor, councillors), an estimated 75 percent of registered voters in the Philippines turned out to cast their ballots. (At this writing, the turnout of Filipinos overseas is 23 percent of registered voters, up from 17 percent in the 2007 mid-term elections.) With as many as 40 percent of registered voters aged between 18-35, it is possible that as many as three million were first-time voters, prompting projections of a ‘youth swing vote’ in these elections.

Across the country, Filipino voters persevered through the long queues that formed at many polling stations, awaiting their turn as election officials struggled with malfunctioning machines in places, or as their fellow citizens worked out how to cast their ballots in this first ever automated election. Aquino himself reportedly had to wait for several hours before he could vote in his home province of Tarlac. Undoubtedly, the wait and the heat took its toll, and there were a few more serious incidents of election-related violence in places, notably in parts of Mindanao.

However, the overall process and outcome of the elections is a far cry from the widespread and systematic electoral fraud and violence that some observers had anticipated. Such predictions stemmed in part from the November 2009 massacre in Maguindanao Province and related fears focused on other local allies of the outgoing president who, it was thought, would fight bitterly to avoid defeat at the hands of their respective local rivals. The untested, new automated voting system and its vulnerability to technical problems and massive fraud had also fuelled speculations.

Against such concerns for the integrity of the electoral process and outcome, Philippine democracy instead appears to have passed a milestone with the 2010 elections. First of all, the 2010 general elections have claimed fewer lives due to election-related violence than previous national election years. Second, the successful introduction of an automated voting system allowed for a rapid tabulation of the votes, thus eliminating the concerns for electoral fraud during previous elections when the manual vote count required several days to deliver the final election results. Third, compared to previous elections, the strong correspondence between pre-election voter surveys and the election results lends credibility to the outcome, not least in the case of the front-runner presidential candidate Aquino. Finally, the large margin gained by Aquino vis-à-vis the runner-up in the presidential race, Joseph Estrada, invites an orderly transfer of power from the incumbent Macapagal-Arroyo administration.

This is not to argue that the elections, as successful as they were, spell a radical transformation of Philippine politics. Indeed, Aquino’s rise to the presidency reflects the enduring resonance in Philippine politics of an oligarchy of old political families and established business interests. As a candidate of the Liberal Party, Aquino also enjoyed the backing of this patronage-based coalition of national and local politicians joined by webs of personal allegiance and political convenience.

The continuities are also evident in the evident staying power of entrenched local politicians and political families across the country. In northern Luzon, Imelda Marcos, widow of long-time Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos, won a congressional seat in Marcos’s home province of Ilocos Norte, whilst daughter Imee Marcos has won the governorship of the province. Elsewhere in Luzon, outgoing president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo won a congressional seat in her home province of Pampanga. The Ampatuan family, which stands accused of the massacre of 57 people in November 2009, appears to have retained a number of key local posts in Maguindanao province in central Mindanao. The Senate has likewise seen (re)election for a handful of established dynasties. This election does not signify dramatic change, but rather the continuation of slow, gradual, and limited shifts in the means of doing politics in the Philippines, rather than the ends.

Eva-Lotta Hedman is Research Fellow of the LSE IDEAS Southeast Asia Programme.