The lack of substance behind Brazil's and Argentina's recognition of Palestinian independence

By Guy Burton

Brazilian flags have been highly visible on Ramallah streets over the past few days, almost as much as in June and before the country crashed out of the World Cup. Their presence has much to do with public sentiment in the West Bank this week and following Brazil’s decision to recognise a Palestinian state within the 1967 Green Line. Brasilia’s announcement was followed by Argentina’s decision to do the same, a statement which should bring out many similarly mothballed Argentine flags in the de facto Palestinian capital as well.

This Latin American diplomatic charge is expected to continue, with Uruguay, Chile, Paraguay and Peru all making similar statements in the next few months. Palestinian policymakers may feel some degree of satisfaction, especially those around Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, whose government presented a two-year plan to achieve Palestinian independence in August last year. However, they should not be getting too carried away, since the Brazilian and Argentine positions give little away.

At the same time, Brazil and Argentina have been at the brunt of a predictably critical Israeli reaction. Israel claims that the Brazilian and Argentine decisions were taken outside the accepted mode, by being unilaterally announced rather than as a result of negotiations between themselves and the Palestinians. In its official statement, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that the Oslo Accords require the final status of the West Bank and Gaza to be settled through negotiations while the Road Map laid out a vision of a Palestinian state to be achieved through Israeli and Palestinians negotiations. The appeal to both Oslo and the Road Map are designed to emphasise legitimacy, especially by the latter: the Road Map was endorsed by the Quartet, which includes the UN and is therefore the expression of the international community.

Israel has strong backing for its position. On 7 December, PJ Crowley, a US State Department spokesman, said that “the only way to resolve the core issues within the process is through direct negotiations. That remains our focus. And we do not favor that course of action. As we’ve said many, many times, any unilateral action, we believe, is counterproductive.” Although why exactly the move was counterproductive, he failed to say while also overlooking Americans’ acquiescence of the ‘right’ kind of unilateralism.

While Washington criticizes Brasilia and Buenos Aires for their ‘wrong’ unilateral decisions, American policymakers refuse to say the same of Israel. After nearly three years without direct negotiations between the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships, they restarted in September only to flounder weeks later, when the Israelis’ 10-month settlement freeze – which was partial because it was only limited to new constructions and not those that already had planning permission or which were based in Jerusalem – ran out. For both the Palestinians and Americans, extending the freeze would have been a sign of good faith for talks to continue. But Israel refused and despite American efforts to bribe the Netanyahu government with a $3bn arms package to extend the moratorium for a further three months, Washington appears to have admitted defeat on a future freeze.

This American failure matters far more than any statement by a Latin American government – which will reassure the Israelis while deceiving the Palestinians. Even within the Israeli peace camp, the section of society most inclined to accept international involvement in the process, the Latin Americans’ influence has been largely disregarded. A prominent Israeli activist, Gershon Baskin of the Israel Palestine Centre for Research and Information, effectively overlooked Brazil and Argentina when he said that their decisions highlighted the vacuum in the current stalled negotiations and American absence in bringing the two sides together. For him and others like him, only Washington matters.

At the same time, the Argentine and Brazilian decisions promise more than they deliver by failing to back up support for Palestinian sovereignty. On one hand, their capacity and willingness to construct a Palestinian state within the Green Line is extremely marginal. The amount pledged (as opposed to have been spent) by Brazil to the Palestinians has been $20m since the mid-1990s. By way of comparison, the EU and Washington contribute $600m and $350m respectively per year.

On the other hand, it is not clear what action either country will take to hold Israel to various UN resolutions and legal obligations as an occupying force in the West Bank. It is doubtful that they will apply economic leverage, especially given rising trade across the Atlantic. Israeli-Argentine trade amounts to around $300m per year while Israeli-Brazilian trade was around $1bn in 2009 (down from $1.6bn in 2008). Much of that trade constitutes Israeli exports ($1.2bn), many of them related to the arms industry. Moreover, both Latin American countries’ trade with Israel has been formalized through a free trade agreement between Israel and the regional, trading bloc, Mercosur, which came into effect in April.

Why then have Argentina and Buenos Aires taken the decision to recognize Palestine? With regard to Israel, Israeli policymakers can bluster against the Latin Americans’ diplomatic recognition of Palestine – but its leaders know that politically, when compared to the US, neither Brazil nor Argentina matters. Their involvement in the process to date has been very limited. Moreover, neither country is likely to damage economic ties between themselves and Israel; diplomatic pressure remains disconnected from the business of trade.

As for Palestine, the benefits of offering diplomatic recognition by Argentina and Brazil far outweigh the (verbal) opposition heaped by Israel. Both the Argentine and Brazilian positions present a degree of foreign policy continuity. The two countries – indeed Latin America generally – have become increasingly pro-Arab since 1967. In part this reflected economic pressures from the early 1970s when the then military dictatorships struggled to secure reliable and reasonably priced oil inputs to supply their import substitution industrialization policies at the time. Brazil even signed up to an anti-Zionist resolution at the UN in this period (subsequently reversed at the end of the Cold War).

More recently, links between the Arab world and Latin America have increased. The past decade has coincided with a rise in trade between Latin America and the Middle East on the one hand and greater diplomatic contact on the other. In 2003 Brazil’s President Lula proposed an Arab-South American summit, the first which took place in Brasilia in 2005 and followed by Doha in 2009 (with Peru to follow next year). At both meetings, the issue of Palestinian sovereignty has been given particular airing in the speeches and space in the final declarations. Meanwhile, Brazil has been courting support for it to become a permanent member of the Security Council. To achieve this it has sought to project itself beyond its hemisphere and to present itself as a leader of the developing world.

Consequently, for both Brazil and Argentina, extending diplomatic recognition for an independent Palestine is an easy way of building up credibility in the Arab world and with little risk of any action beyond harsh Israeli words. In other words, that the two countries have taken the course they did demonstrates a decision based on weighing the relative costs and benefits. In this instance, both realized that there was little to lose and much to gain, especially in the Arab world where Palestinian sovereignty remains a primary concern (albeit more rhetorical than acted upon these days) and with little risk of losing valuable Israeli markets.

Guy Burton is a researcher at the Centre for Development Studies at Birzeit University and a research associate for the Latin America International Affairs Programme at the LSE Ideas Centre.

The Bigger Picture: Israel-Turkey Relations in Context

By Guy Burton

The fallout from the Gaza flotilla debacle at the end of May provides an opportunity to consider the relative positions of Israel and Turkey both regionally and globally. The furore has reinforced the image of Israel as a growing liability for American and European interests and highlighted the increasing importance of Turkey.

Israel’s difficulties stem from its inward looking nature. What has been especially noticeable in the days following the crisis has been the extent to which Israeli leaders have sought to portray themselves as victims rather than villains. In a statement put out soon after the event the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that the violence on the part of the protesters was pre-meditated since they were carrying weapons when the Israeli soldiers boarded. Meanwhile Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu argued that while the protestors’ deaths were regrettable, the Israeli soldiers were acting in self-defence. Almost overlooked in this appeal to self-justification was why the confrontation happened in the first place, namely the continuing siege against Gaza and whether that policy is yielding results.

The disconnection between Israel and the wider world over this crisis is contrasted with a second factor: the growing attention paid by policymakers in Washington and Brussels to Turkey. Turkey straddles several volatile areas – the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans – which means that its application for European Union (EU) membership, participation in the Israel-Palestine conflict and engagement with Iran over its nuclear programme must therefore be given due consideration by the US and Europe.

Turkey’s rising international profile has obliged its governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) party to present itself as a moderating force in order to appeal to international interlocutors like Washington and Brussels. This has posed a particular challenge to the AKP, especially given its attachment to political Islam and pursuit of certain policies. These have included requiring women to cover themselves, allocating jobs and promotions on the basis of religious commitment and pressuring women out of the workforce.

At the same time though there have been a number of pressures that have constrained the AKP’s religious zeal – and therefore helped its leadership present itself as reasonable and restrained. Internally, the diverse nature of the AKP’s membership (pro-Islamic reformers, bankers, small and medium-sized business people) contributed to a looser ideological commitment and an emphasis on ‘conservative democracy’. Externally, the AKP faces pressure on several fronts: from a military willing to intervene to maintain a secular state; an electorate that withholds its votes when the government slows down democratic reforms; and EU members such as Germany who threaten to block Turkey’s entry into the EU on religious grounds.

In addition, several other factors have contributed towards a more active Turkish foreign policy in recent years including Russia’s military conflict with Georgia in 2008 and Russia’s confrontation with Europe over gas supplies. Ankara’s response has been to act as a broker in the region, in particular as an energy route. Indeed, perhaps the most recent evidence of an increasing Turkish willingness to take on a more active foreign policy was in last month’s fuel swap agreement between Turkey, Brazil and Iran, whereby Turkey agreed to process some of Iran’s uranium. The agreement between the three was also significant for illustrating growing Turkish independence from both Washington and Europe, a fact borne out by Turkey’s vote against sanctions on Iran in the UN Security Council (along with Brazil) on 9 June.

However, it would be incorrect to assume that the respective waxing and waning of Turkish and Israeli influence on the US and Europe is fully complete. It is not yet clear that Turkey constitutes a more important player for American and European interests than Israel. Indeed, both countries have a particular role to play, which is largely shaped by the wider regional context. Compared to the Turks, Israel arguably has much greater influence with the Americans and Europeans, which is due both to internal factors on both sides of the Atlantic and their search for reliable allies in the region.

Israel continues to matter on both sides of the Atlantic, regardless of its actions. Its supporters have penetrated the American and European decision-making processes to a far greater extent than have those for Turkey. The case in Washington is well known in this respect, with The Israel Lobby by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt providing a meticulous account for US support towards Israel even when it runs contrary to its own self-interest. While the Jewish lobby may be less visible in Europe, it is still significant. The recent efforts to build a new pro-Israel, pro-peace movement has generated conflict within the community over who best represents Israel’s interests in European capitals.

In contrast to Israel, Turkish lobbying efforts remain weaker and less organised. This is exemplified by both the 23-year EU accession process and the reticence of its politicians and business leaders to lobby actively during periods of military intervention and political uncertainty.

In international terms, a rather simplistic contrast can be drawn between the two in their foreign policy approach: Israel’s hardline stick to Turkey’s more diplomatic carrot. Both stances have their respective use which Americans and Europeans have readily exploited. In the case of Israel, its denunciation of Hamas as a terrorist organisation has been supported by both Washington and Brussels; indeed, former President George W Bush included Hamas in his ‘war on terror’. Meanwhile, Turkey’s diplomatic objectives have been generally shared by the US and Europe, including mediating peace between Israel and the Palestinians, stability in Iraq and Afghanistan and a nuclear weapon-free Iran. This last concern prompted support for Ankara’s search for a settlement with Iran over its nuclear programme, before it was superseded by a new round of sanctions.

While Israel is currently subject to international condemnation, its more aggressive stance vis-à-vis Iran’s nuclear programme could provide useful support should the sanctions embargo lead to a severe deterioration in relations between the Americans and Europeans with Tehran. In other words, a country that may currently seem like a liability could turn out to offer sufficient cover for a non-diplomatic solution.

In addition, that Israel remains in decision-makers’ calculation is evident in Americans’ and Europeans’ reluctance to cut ties with the Jewish state. Unlike the new sanctions regime on Iran (including a ban on the sale of arms systems, ballistic missiles, sea and air cargo inspections and financial and travel restrictions against the regime), criticism against Israel has been more muted, mainly confined to calls for an international inquiry. Neither the EU nor the OECD (which Israel joined days before the flotilla incident) has adopted positions that could pressure Israel to review its policy towards Gaza, such as reviewing economic relations.

Meanwhile, Turkey’s diplomatic approach can – and has – been used when necessary, only to be abandoned whenever the need no longer suits. This illustrates its ultimately marginal role, both regionally and globally. As noted above, last month’s accord between Turkey, Brazil and Iran was seen as a useful measure by the US and its European allies: it provided scope for a soft-footed alternative to reduce the threat from Iran’s potential nuclear weapon programme. That the accord has been so quickly abandoned is due largely to assurances by the US and its European allies to Russia and China, the permanent Security Council members most sympathetic to Tehran, that sanctions would not affect Iran’s energy sector or its population. The vote for sanctions highlights the limits of Turkish diplomacy. Its own ‘no’ vote may allow it to claim a moral victory but it also highlights which countries continue to call the shots.

Elsewhere, Turkish reticence has had other costs. Having opted out of the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 it effectively removed itself from any direct control over the war’s outcome. On one level Turkey’s fear that a wave of potential refugees would flee across its border with Iraq was unrealised. On another level, Turkey’s opposition to an independent Kurdish state has been undermined by expanded Kurdish autonomy since the war. This is apparent both in the Kurdish presence in the oil cities of Kirkuk and Mosul and the presence of the separatist Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) which uses the areas as a refuge in its armed struggle against Turkey. This has prompted Ankara to conduct intermittent incursions across the border against the PKK. Similarly, Turkish involvement in the region’s other conflict hotspot, Afghanistan, also remains constrained. Often cited as an important and influential Muslim and democratic ally, its present contribution to NATO in the country is less than 2000 troops.

In sum then, it would be wrong to assume that the US and Europe is abandoning support for Israel in favour of Turkey. The American and European policy establishments do not operate in so simplistic a fashion. Both Israel and Turkey offer Washington and its European allies different approaches, the former a robust, confrontational stance and the latter the opportunity for dialogue through an intermediary. Whichever path is chosen will depend on American and European interests in the region and an assessment on a case-by-case basis as to whether it is better served by associating with Israel or Turkey. How that decision is reached though will not be achieved in a completely dispassionate way though. It will include different factors, including support by Israel and Turkey for past policies as well as the relative influence of the Israeli and Turkish lobbies within American and European domestic politics.

Guy Burton is a research associate at the LSE Ideas Centre.

Shifting Sands is the blog of the Middle East International Affairs Programme at LSE IDEAS, analysing current events in the Middle East and contributing to the ongoing deliberations over policy prescriptions.

Amber Holewinski, Editor

Turkey and Israel: The End of the Affair?

By Christopher Phillips

As the dust from Israel’s 31st May attack on a Gaza-bound Turkish aid ship continues to settle, and the various sides push their own accounts of who violated which international laws and protocols, one thing is for certain: Turkish-Israeli relations are in dire straits. Despite a long history of friendship, tensions between the two have been simmering since Tel Aviv’s sudden invasion of Gaza in December 2008, further exacerbated by Israel’s public humiliation of Turkey’s ambassador and Ankara’s improving ties with the Jewish state’s enemies in Tehran and Damascus. However, the events 77 miles off the coast of Gaza, in which 4 Turks were amongst the 9 activists killed, has brought matters to a new low with Turkish PM Erdogan declaring the raid a ‘massacre’ and recalling his ambassador to Tel Aviv. So why has this decline come about?

Commentators in the pro-Israel camp have been quick to blame Ankara’s hostility on the Islamist roots of Turkey’s ruling AKP party. According to this narrative, the AKP, angry at continual rejection by the EU, is turning its attention eastwards to recast Turkey in the Ottoman role of dominant power in the Middle East. One writer, the Dayan Centre’s Joshua Teitelbaum, even went far enough to accuse Erdogan of waging ‘Jihad’ on Israel. Yet such analysis is severely flawed. The AKP have been in power since 2002 and, until the Gaza war of 2008, enjoyed excellent relations with Israel: extending military and economic cooperation and mediating Tel Aviv’s peace talks with Syria. Certainly no such Islamist ideological opposition to Israel was visible in those first six years.

Similarly Turkey has in no way turned its back on Europe. The EU remains Turkey’s principal trading partner, an economic relationship that has prompted the unprecedented growth that is allowing Ankara greater financial clout in the Middle East. Far from an Islamic idealism, Turkish foreign relations under the AKP has been characterised by a flexible realism. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s notion of ‘zero problems with neighbours’ has allowed Ankara to maintain and indeed strengthen its ties with Europe whilst abandoning historical hostilities with Russia, Greece, Syria and Iran in order to enhance Turkey’s influence in its surrounding countries.

The decline in relations with Tel Aviv is therefore better explained by Israel’s bizarrely provocative behaviour towards Turkey, rather than a renewed Islamic idealism in Ankara. Indeed, until recently Israel too could be considered a neighbour with which Turkey had ‘zero problems’, as illustrated by the first six years of AKP-Israel harmony. Yet Israel has seemed foolishly insensitive to Turkish national pride in its recent actions. Erdogan felt personally betrayed, for example, in 2008 when he had spent hours mediating a potential peace deal between Tel Aviv and Damascus, only for then Israeli Premier Olmert to scupper the talks by launching the Gaza invasion without any consultation with Ankara. Similarly current Israeli Foreign Officials deliberately humiliated the Turkish ambassador in 2009 by making him sit in a ‘low chair’ during a televised interview, prompting public outrage in Turkey. Now, following the flotilla crisis, despite Israel’s pleas that they had asked Ankara not to sanction the convoy, four bodies returned home to Turkey who had been shot at point-blank range by their government’s supposed ally - a difficult position for any leader to justify to an angry nationalist population.

Yet these actions point to a wider trend in the Middle East on behalf of both actors. For Israel, it displays an even greater siege mentality than usual under the stewardship of Premier Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Lieberman. This government’s willingness to discard any international criticism whether it be over the Gaza blockade or stolen western identities to assassinate Hamas leaders in Dubai, and their direct refusal of US wishes to halt West Bank settlements, suggests a leadership convinced of its own rectitude and steadfast refusal to compromise, whatever the costs to its international image. In this light, losing its oldest and most important Muslim ally is a price it seems strangely willing to pay.

For Turkey, we see an emerging regional power that has less and less need of an ally whose actions are increasingly indefensible. In the end, Israel is a tiny market of 6 million consumers, whilst the Arab and Muslim Middle East offer much more. Ankara, one suspects, would rather not have to choose, but conversely, Erdogan will be aware of his rising star in the Middle East as a champion of the Palestinians – even if his primary motivation remains Turkish national interests.

As such trends continue, Israel should be cautious not to disregard Turkey’s importance. This is no powerless Arab dictatorship but a thriving, militarily strong, democratic regional giant. Moreover, Western states, notably the US, have long looked to Turkey as its role model in the Muslim World: proof that Islam and democracy can be compatible. At the final analysis, Tel Aviv should understand that, from a realist perspective that ignores the power of domestic lobbies and sentimental attachments, Turkey is far more important to American and European long-term objectives in the Middle East than Israel is. The last thing Tel Aviv should do is to deliberately provoke circumstances whereby the West has to choose.

Christopher Phillips is a PhD student in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science and Programme Assistant on the IDEAS Middle East International Affairs Programme.

Shifting Sands is the blog of the Middle East International Affairs Programme at LSE IDEAS, analysing current events in the Middle East and contributing to the ongoing deliberations over policy prescriptions.

Amber Holewinski, Editor

A Decade for the Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon: How Much Has Changed?

By Yaniv Voller

Ten years ago, in May 2000, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) withdrew from Lebanon after almost two decades of military control over South Lebanon and ended direct political interference in Lebanese political affairs.

The IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon, popularly described as Israel’s Vietnam, was perceived by commentators to bring a radical change to the region’s geopolitics. Some, particularly in Israel and outside of the Middle East, saw the withdrawal as yet another phase in the ongoing peace agreements between Israel and its neighbours and a necessary step toward a comprehensive peace agreement with Lebanon. But those remained a minority amidst sceptics on both the Israeli and the Arab side.

For many in Israel, and particularly those in the military circles and the right wing parties, the withdrawal meant the loss of Israel’s deterrent force vis-à-vis its enemies in the region. The combination of the withdrawals’ hasty and chaotic nature, the fact that it was done overnight and two months before the planned withdrawal date in order to surprise Hezbollah and to avoid Israeli casualties (perhaps the only success of the withdrawal), and the abrupt collapse of Israel’s long-time proxy, the South Lebanese Army, all served to further the beliefs Israelis who viewed the withdrawal as a colossal defeat. Retired senior officers, commentators and MPs predicted that soon Hezbollah, the Palestinians and the Syrians would use the opportunity to attack Israel in its weakness. They also predicted that South Lebanon would soon become a front between Israel and Iran –the state now free to position its armed forces in “Hezbollah-land.” Those who warned against the withdrawal were further vindicated when the Second Intifada erupted in the occupied territories less than four months after the withdrawal, Hezbollah kidnapped three Israeli soldiers and attacked Israel (marking the beginning of the summer 2006 war).

On the other hand, Arab commentators saw the IDF withdrawal as a cosmetic operation which provided an excuse for Israel to use excessive force against its enemies and an opportunity to dodge a peace agreement with Syria and the Palestinians. Indeed, for these commentators as well, the Israeli operations in Lebanon in 2006 and in Gaza in 2008 were perceived as an Israeli effort to regain its deterrent power.

Yet, a brief review of the last decade reveals that, at least in the short term, the withdrawal has had no significant implications on regional geopolitics. In fact, most regional developments perceived as a direct outcome of the withdrawal are better attributed to internal state dynamics rather than changes due to the withdrawal. Firstly, when it comes to deterrent power, Israel still acts as a regional superpower – yet it cannot handle guerrilla fighting and popular uprising, as evidenced by the Palestinian Intifadas or Hezbollah’s guerrilla attacks. In other words, Israel began losing its deterrent power before the withdrawal, when it proved incapable of containing the first Palestinian Intifada or preventing Hezbollah from shelling Israeli border towns. The Second Palestinian Intifada, erupted not because of Israel’s loss of deterrent power – but because the Palestinians realised that Israel could not be defeated militarily or by diplomatic means – as happened in the First Intifada. Hezbollah’s attacks on Israel indicate an improvement in Hezbollah’s capabilities more than they indicate greater boldness from its side. These attacks served those within Israel who argued that the withdrawal would lead to Hezbollah’s strengthening – but such an argument means ignoring the fact that Israel never controlled the whole of Lebanon – and that Hezbollah could obtain and store weapons in other parts of Lebanon. Finally, Israel’s withdrawal indeed brought with it some immediate political gains for Hezbollah including widespread support in Arab public opinion as the first Arab force to defeat Israel. Yet, even this achievement has been eroded as Hezbollah has been increasingly perceived by large segments of the Arab public as an Iranian proxy in an Arab state.

On the other hand, the withdrawal did not change much in Israel’s regional security conception. The IDF may have learned tactical lessons from the withdrawal, but Israel’s defense policies remain the same. Israel’s attacks on Lebanon and the Gaza strip, though devastating, reflect some rational calculation and some consideration of international public opinion, rather than being only a desperate move to regain deterrence power (here it should be clear that albeit being utterly destructive, both offences in Lebanon and Gaza, the IDF did not use its full military capabilities).

Hence, whereas Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 had a dramatic impact on the geopolitics of the region, its withdrawal from Lebanon seems to have had an effect mainly within Israel and Lebanon. Of course, time may unfold further implications of this action – but at least for now it seems as though it has been overestimated.

Yaniv Voller is a second year PhD student at the London School of Economics and is interested in secessionism, legitimacy and recognition, non-state actors, Iraq, and Turkey. He is also a graduate teaching assistant in the International History department at the LSE.

Shifting Sands is the blog of the Middle East International Affairs Programme at LSE IDEAS, analysing current events in the Middle East and contributing to the ongoing deliberations over policy prescriptions.

Amber Holewinski, Editor

Jordan’s Frustration with the Middle East Peace Process

By Nigel Ashton

In a widely quoted interview with The Times last May King Abdullah of Jordan warned that ‘if we delay our peace negotiations then there is going to be another conflict between Arabs or Muslims and Israel in the next 12-18 months’. 12 of the 18 months are now up and Israeli-Palestinian negotiations seem further away than ever from even beginning, never mind reaching, fruition. If King Abdullah’s frustrations were great a year ago, they have only increased in the course of the past month. The recent collapse of Palestinian-Israeli proximity talks before they had even begun, coupled with the intransigence of the Netanyahu government on the issue of settlement-building, give little reason to believe that the next six months will bring significant progress.

It is no surprise, then, that the tensions in US-Israeli relations which have made headlines in recent weeks have been mirrored in a further worsening of the already bad bilateral relationship between Israel and Jordan. In an interview with the Wall Street Journal given just before his recent trip to the US, King Abdullah was frank about the troubled nature of the relationship.

The background in personal relations between Abdullah and Netanyahu was unpromising from the outset. The first three months of Abdullah’s reign in 1999, after the death of his father Hussein, were a period of strained relations with the outgoing first Netanyahu government. Despite this, when Netanyahu returned to office in 2009, Abdullah claimed to have given him the benefit of the doubt, waiting to judge him on his actions in office second time round. ‘I was extremely optimistic by the vision he had for peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians and the Israelis and the Arabs.’

Albeit that this comment may have significantly exaggerated the true extent of the King’s hopes for the new government, the experience of the past 12 months has been one of unrelieved frustration. ‘Everything I've seen on the ground has made me extremely sceptical, and I'm probably one of the more optimistic people you will meet in this part of the world’ Abdullah told the Wall Street Journal. Abdullah’s judgement was that relations with Israel are now at their lowest ebb since the signature of the peace treaty in 1994.

Sceptics might question why this should matter to Israel. After all, despite the frustrations expressed by the Jordanian monarch, there is no prospect of Jordan reneging on its peace treaty with Israel. Nor does Jordan have the power to harm Israel either economically or politically. But, there are two reasons why the dire state of bilateral relations should matter to Israel.

Firstly, if a peace process is to be initiated before the window of opportunity closes for a two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it will likely need a constructive role on the part of Jordan. Although Jordanian officials from the King down never tire of underlining that there is no Jordanian solution to the Palestinian question, any Palestinian state created through negotiations with Israel would also depend on close relations with Jordan. Precisely what political structure might govern this relationship could be a matter for future discussion.

King Abdullah implied as much in an interview which he gave to Fareed Zakaria at the end of January during the Davos economic summit. Although he denied for the umpteenth time that there was any ‘Jordanian option’ which might substitute for a peace deal negotiated directly between Israel and the Palestinians, Abdullah implicitly left open in his remarks what might happen after the creation of a Palestinian state. He did not explicitly rule out some form of future association with Jordan if a Palestinian state were created.

Secondly, as Abdullah suggested in his interview with The Times last May, Jordan can play a constructive role in helping to marshal broader support for an Israeli-Palestinian solution. This role might be particularly important given the centrality of the question of the future status of Jerusalem to these negotiations. As Abdullah put it, what could be on offer would be not just a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but a ‘57 state solution’ whereby the entire Muslim world would recognise the Jewish state as part of the peace deal.

These considerations might seem distant and utopian to an Israeli government overwhelmingly preoccupied with the present. But, with the projected shifts in the demographic balance between Arab and Jew in Israel and the occupied territories, together with the likely spread of weapons of mass destruction in the region, the status quo is inherently unstable.

The clock is still ticking down towards Abdullah’s deadline.

Next Week: Iran: Who has the power?

Shifting Sands is the blog of the Middle East International Affairs Programme at LSE IDEAS, analysing current events in the Middle East and contributing to the ongoing deliberations over policy prescriptions.

Amber Holewinski, Editor

Egypt: What are the potential internal political affects of the Gaza wall?

Welcome to the Shifting Sands blog at LSE IDEAS. We invite PhD students and academics from throughout the UK and abroad to analyse current events in the Middle East and add to the ongoing deliberations over policy prescriptions. Our next contributor, Guy Burton, explores the political implications of the Gaza wall inside Egypt.

We look forward to exploring both regional and topical issues relating to current events.
Amber Holewinski, Editor, LSE IDEAS Middle East International Affairs Programme Blog

Egypt: What are the potential internal political affects of the Gaza wall?

By Guy Burton

In December foreign protestors travelled to Egypt with the purpose of marking the anniversary of Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, which left approximately 1400 Palestinians and thirteen Israelis dead. However, their efforts resulted in a crackdown by the authorities who sought to prevent them from crossing the Sinai Peninsula to the border crossing of Rafah.

Cairo’s response was in line with its Gaza policy. The Egyptian leadership has been active in trying to insulate the situation in Gaza from spilling over domestically. To date it seems that it has largely succeeded, although it is uncertain how sustainable it will be, especially given next year’s presidential election and the likelihood of the current president, Hosni Mubarak, stepping down after 30 years in power.

Under Mubarak, the Egyptian leadership sought a mediating role between Israel and Palestine, a role which is supported by Washington. Egypt’s engagement has cost it regional influence, losing public Arab and Muslim support to the more confrontational Syrian and Iranian leaderships. Yet arguably Cairo’s stance could not be otherwise: Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip has put increasing pressure on Rafah as the main point of entry. Unable to meet the demand, Palestinians in Gaza have increasingly resorted to the use of underground tunnels to bring in everyday items. But it was also through these routes that weapons have been brought into Gaza, with which militias have targeted Israeli settlements on the other side.

As a result, Egypt has adopted a two-fold strategy. First, it has been involved in various negotiations between Israel and the dominant Hamas party that gained power in Gaza in 2007. Although not a supporter of Hamas, Mubarak’s government has contributed to the stop-start talks over the captured Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, in 2006 and helped broker a ceasefire between the two parties during the first half of 2008. Second, it has responded to pressure from both the Israelis and the US to stop the use of these tunnels. Consequently, over the past three years it has stepped up security measures and surveillance along the border, bringing the level of smuggling down from its peak in 2008.

Even though Egypt has received regional opprobrium for its stance, the policy has yet to compromise the regime domestically. Although there were several attacks in Cairo in the months following the Israel-Gaza conflict, including the bombing of the Khan el-Khalili market which left one foreign tourist dead, they were soon discounted as the harbinger of a more organised campaign against the government.

Although the most visible demonstrations over Gaza have come from the main opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood, its capacity to destabilise the regime remains severely constrained. Not only is its level of support modest, it is unable to project itself sufficiently to challenge the regime. The government’s use of legal constraints prevents the Muslim Brotherhood from organising as a political party, thereby forcing its candidates to stand as independents and excluding it from running for the presidency.

That the regime is so dominant demonstrates the manner in which it has controlled the political process in Egypt. Despite a process of economic and political liberalisation (during which state participation in the economy has declined and the number of civil society organisations has grown), the leadership continues to count on both the support of key actors (i.e. big business, the military, internal security forces and the bureaucracy) and various forms of coercion. This helped maintain a weak opposition in both political and civil society, the Brotherhood excepted. Consequently Mubarak’s successor – if it is not his son, Gamal – will most likely emerge from within the regime.

Similarly, the regime has avoided any fallout from the global financial crisis. With an economy dominated by tourism, exports, and revenues from the Suez Canal, there was concern in late 2008. Figures from the first quarter of 2009 reinforced those fears: GDP fell by 4% and unemployment rose above 9%. Meanwhile, poverty levels increased from 19% to 21%. However, last month the IMF reported that Egypt’s economy had been insulated by its lack of exposure to financial markets and structured products. The Prime Minister, Ahmed Nazif, reported that while the unemployment level remains stable at the current rate, the economy is now projected to grow by 5% this year.

However, that the regime appears securely in control does not mean that a smooth transition of power or policy continuity is assured next year. On one hand, risk may emerge from the presidential election itself, especially if the government candidate beats an independent candidate who has done well enough to arouse suspicion about the result. Like Iran last year and Mexico in 2006 (which like Egypt was dominated by one party until 2000), should this happen, then a ‘stolen election’ could act as an issue around which the domestic opposition could coalesce and grow. On the other hand, Mubarak’s successor will have to contend with Egypt’s declining regional credibility as an international mediator. This may encourage the new president to recalibrate policy strategy in relation to Gaza to conciliate Hamas and its supporters in Egypt.

But for either threat to emerge will depend on the salience of certain issues over the next 18 months. Among these factors will include whether economic recovery proves sustainable and the amount of domestic sympathy towards Gaza. The latter will be especially tested if public opinion increasingly sees the government’s Gaza policy as little different to that of Israel’s. Indeed, matters may not be helped by Egypt’s near completion of a controversial construction of a 10km long, 30m high steel wall on the Gaza border. Although it has been built to discourage smuggling through the tunnels, it may be seen as resembling the Separation Wall that Israel is building between itself and the Palestinians in the West Bank.

Guy Burton is a research associate for the LSE Ideas Centre.

Next Week: Lebanon and Syria: What are the prospects for improved relations?

Israel and Palestine: Can peace talks resume?

Welcome to the Middle East International Affairs (MEIA) blog at LSE IDEAS. We invite PhD students and academics from throughout the UK and abroad to analyse current events in the Middle East and add to the ongoing deliberations over policy prescriptions. Our next contributor, Anne de Jong, examines an option for moving out of a stalemate in Middle East peace negotiations.

We look forward to exploring both regional and topical issues relating to current events.
Amber Holewinski, Editor, LSE IDEAS Middle East International Affairs Programme Blog

Peace or Justice

By Anne de Jong

It all started so promisingly—the famous Cairo speech on the 4th of July by President Obama, the appointment of Northern Ireland peace broker George J. Mitchell as his special envoy to the Middle East and an unprecedented commitment from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Yet barely one year in, preconditions kept the negotiation table untouched, the situation in Gaza in a state of ‘permanent humanitarian crisis’ and prominent commentators already declared this new initiative dead. With even the ever optimistic Mitchell acknowledging ‘unforeseen complexities and difficulties,’ one should ask: Are peace talks possible in Israel/Palestine?

Negotiating Negotiations

One would assume that negotiations start at the negotiating table, but the first obstacle to resuming peace talks is preconditions made by both the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli State. The Palestinian Authority demands a full settlement freeze because, as Palestinian lawyer Michael Tarasi put it, ‘we are negotiating about dividing a pizza and in the meantime, Israel is eating it.’

A settlement freeze was fully supported by the U.S. administration with a strong statement by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: “The president wants to see a stop to settlements-not some settlements, not outposts, not ‘natural growth’ exceptions. That is our position.”

When Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected this position, however, no sanctions or pressures were put in place. Rather than placing conditions on loan guarantees or limiting military aid, Clinton applauded Netanyahu’s offer of ten months settlement restraint and labeled it ‘an important step forward.’

This settlement restraint does not concern expansion in occupied East Jerusalem where the construction of almost 700 new apartments has just been approved. Nor does it cover infrastructure development to and from settlements in the West Bank. Welcoming Netanyahu’s settlement restraint, and thus renouncing their own demand for a full settlement stop, not only labels the U.S administration as inconsistent, but more seriously it endangers the credibility of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.

He has already finished his term in office without elections and made little progress toward overcoming the internal rivalry between Fatah and Hamas. He cannot come to the negotiation table without losing the already fragile support of the Palestinian people as long as settlement construction is ongoing.

In addition, Israel put forward a precondition for negotiations which it knows that no Palestinian leader can accept: the recognition of Israel as the ‘nation-state of the Jewish people.’ The PLO already recognized the right of Israel to exist as a state in 1993 in a series of official and public letters leading up to the Oslo Accords. The difference this time lies in the acceptance of the national character of Israel as Jewish. This would predetermine negotiations on the “right of return” of Palestinian refugees and further relegate the status of Palestinian-Israelis to non-nationals.

Knowing quite well that the Palestinian Authority cannot afford to disregard 1.5 million Palestinians living in Israel and approximately 5 million refugees and their descendants living in the diaspora, it appears that Netanyahu is stalling if not sabotaging any final status negotiations. And where the Obama administration proved to be flexible on the precondition of a settlement freeze, they blindly accept this far-reaching Israeli demand.

What kind of Peace?

It is possible, though unlikely, that the U.S. might use their economic muscle to force both parties to the table. Once there, however, the ‘endgame’ looms large. With an apparent worldwide consensus for a two-state solution, it will be Mitchell’s job to transform this consensus into a pragmatic peace process.

The Palestinian demands are clear: a sovereign Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza with East Jerusalem as its capital. A full withdrawal from the Occupied Territories would not only halt Palestinian hostilities towards Israel, but would also guarantee full normalized relations with the 22 surrounding Arab countries, in line with the 2002 Arab Initiative.

Israel’s demands are less straightforward. While Netanyahu expressed the wish for an independent Palestinian state to be created alongside Israel, his Four No’s would prevent any pragmatic steps towards that end.

According to Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat, Netanyahu’s Four No’s—No to a settlement freeze, No to dividing Jerusalem, No to 1967 borders and No to refugees—would render impossible ‘a viable, independent, and sovereign Palestinian state.’ Netanyahu’s vision of a demilitarized Palestinian state without control over its own borders, riddled with Israeli settlements and with a continued Israeli military presence in the Jordan Valley would create a ‘Palestinian state’ without sovereignty or independence at all.

Peace or Justice

That brings us to the disturbing contemporary reality: a stalemate in negotiations with an eerie resemblance to the 2000 Camp David breakdown. Without Jerusalem, without sovereign borders, and without at least compensation for the refugees, Palestinians are left with Netanyahu’s vision of an ‘economic peace’ under complete Israeli military control.

Gaza would remain isolated and the West Bank divided into pockets of Palestinian reserves. East Jerusalem, whose annexation by Israel is unrecognized by the international community, would see a continuation of house demolitions and evictions. The status of 1.5 million non-Jewish Israelis as second class citizens would not be addressed, and continued institutional and social discrimination against them would be justified under the banner of the Jewish State.

Are peace talks possible? Sure. But without Jerusalem or viable final borders on the table—without talks that are rooted in international law—they will be empty at best. At worse, they will be a fig leaf for ongoing settlement expansion in the West Bank, ethnic cleansing in East Jerusalem, collective punishment in Gaza and continuing military oppression based on ethnic segregation.

Perhaps a more apt question would be: Would peace talks under current conditions be part of a genuine peace process or merely a continuation of the rapidly-deteriorating status quo?

Anne de Jong is a Dutch PhD student at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the department of Anthropology with a specialization in the Middle East. By combining academia and journalism she aims to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the contemporary Middle East with a special interest in the Israel/Palestine conflict.

Next Week: Turkey: Reengagement with the Middle East?