The lack of substance behind Brazil's and Argentina's recognition of Palestinian independence

By Guy Burton

Brazilian flags have been highly visible on Ramallah streets over the past few days, almost as much as in June and before the country crashed out of the World Cup. Their presence has much to do with public sentiment in the West Bank this week and following Brazil’s decision to recognise a Palestinian state within the 1967 Green Line. Brasilia’s announcement was followed by Argentina’s decision to do the same, a statement which should bring out many similarly mothballed Argentine flags in the de facto Palestinian capital as well.

This Latin American diplomatic charge is expected to continue, with Uruguay, Chile, Paraguay and Peru all making similar statements in the next few months. Palestinian policymakers may feel some degree of satisfaction, especially those around Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, whose government presented a two-year plan to achieve Palestinian independence in August last year. However, they should not be getting too carried away, since the Brazilian and Argentine positions give little away.

At the same time, Brazil and Argentina have been at the brunt of a predictably critical Israeli reaction. Israel claims that the Brazilian and Argentine decisions were taken outside the accepted mode, by being unilaterally announced rather than as a result of negotiations between themselves and the Palestinians. In its official statement, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs argued that the Oslo Accords require the final status of the West Bank and Gaza to be settled through negotiations while the Road Map laid out a vision of a Palestinian state to be achieved through Israeli and Palestinians negotiations. The appeal to both Oslo and the Road Map are designed to emphasise legitimacy, especially by the latter: the Road Map was endorsed by the Quartet, which includes the UN and is therefore the expression of the international community.

Israel has strong backing for its position. On 7 December, PJ Crowley, a US State Department spokesman, said that “the only way to resolve the core issues within the process is through direct negotiations. That remains our focus. And we do not favor that course of action. As we’ve said many, many times, any unilateral action, we believe, is counterproductive.” Although why exactly the move was counterproductive, he failed to say while also overlooking Americans’ acquiescence of the ‘right’ kind of unilateralism.

While Washington criticizes Brasilia and Buenos Aires for their ‘wrong’ unilateral decisions, American policymakers refuse to say the same of Israel. After nearly three years without direct negotiations between the Israeli and Palestinian leaderships, they restarted in September only to flounder weeks later, when the Israelis’ 10-month settlement freeze – which was partial because it was only limited to new constructions and not those that already had planning permission or which were based in Jerusalem – ran out. For both the Palestinians and Americans, extending the freeze would have been a sign of good faith for talks to continue. But Israel refused and despite American efforts to bribe the Netanyahu government with a $3bn arms package to extend the moratorium for a further three months, Washington appears to have admitted defeat on a future freeze.

This American failure matters far more than any statement by a Latin American government – which will reassure the Israelis while deceiving the Palestinians. Even within the Israeli peace camp, the section of society most inclined to accept international involvement in the process, the Latin Americans’ influence has been largely disregarded. A prominent Israeli activist, Gershon Baskin of the Israel Palestine Centre for Research and Information, effectively overlooked Brazil and Argentina when he said that their decisions highlighted the vacuum in the current stalled negotiations and American absence in bringing the two sides together. For him and others like him, only Washington matters.

At the same time, the Argentine and Brazilian decisions promise more than they deliver by failing to back up support for Palestinian sovereignty. On one hand, their capacity and willingness to construct a Palestinian state within the Green Line is extremely marginal. The amount pledged (as opposed to have been spent) by Brazil to the Palestinians has been $20m since the mid-1990s. By way of comparison, the EU and Washington contribute $600m and $350m respectively per year.

On the other hand, it is not clear what action either country will take to hold Israel to various UN resolutions and legal obligations as an occupying force in the West Bank. It is doubtful that they will apply economic leverage, especially given rising trade across the Atlantic. Israeli-Argentine trade amounts to around $300m per year while Israeli-Brazilian trade was around $1bn in 2009 (down from $1.6bn in 2008). Much of that trade constitutes Israeli exports ($1.2bn), many of them related to the arms industry. Moreover, both Latin American countries’ trade with Israel has been formalized through a free trade agreement between Israel and the regional, trading bloc, Mercosur, which came into effect in April.

Why then have Argentina and Buenos Aires taken the decision to recognize Palestine? With regard to Israel, Israeli policymakers can bluster against the Latin Americans’ diplomatic recognition of Palestine – but its leaders know that politically, when compared to the US, neither Brazil nor Argentina matters. Their involvement in the process to date has been very limited. Moreover, neither country is likely to damage economic ties between themselves and Israel; diplomatic pressure remains disconnected from the business of trade.

As for Palestine, the benefits of offering diplomatic recognition by Argentina and Brazil far outweigh the (verbal) opposition heaped by Israel. Both the Argentine and Brazilian positions present a degree of foreign policy continuity. The two countries – indeed Latin America generally – have become increasingly pro-Arab since 1967. In part this reflected economic pressures from the early 1970s when the then military dictatorships struggled to secure reliable and reasonably priced oil inputs to supply their import substitution industrialization policies at the time. Brazil even signed up to an anti-Zionist resolution at the UN in this period (subsequently reversed at the end of the Cold War).

More recently, links between the Arab world and Latin America have increased. The past decade has coincided with a rise in trade between Latin America and the Middle East on the one hand and greater diplomatic contact on the other. In 2003 Brazil’s President Lula proposed an Arab-South American summit, the first which took place in Brasilia in 2005 and followed by Doha in 2009 (with Peru to follow next year). At both meetings, the issue of Palestinian sovereignty has been given particular airing in the speeches and space in the final declarations. Meanwhile, Brazil has been courting support for it to become a permanent member of the Security Council. To achieve this it has sought to project itself beyond its hemisphere and to present itself as a leader of the developing world.

Consequently, for both Brazil and Argentina, extending diplomatic recognition for an independent Palestine is an easy way of building up credibility in the Arab world and with little risk of any action beyond harsh Israeli words. In other words, that the two countries have taken the course they did demonstrates a decision based on weighing the relative costs and benefits. In this instance, both realized that there was little to lose and much to gain, especially in the Arab world where Palestinian sovereignty remains a primary concern (albeit more rhetorical than acted upon these days) and with little risk of losing valuable Israeli markets.

Guy Burton is a researcher at the Centre for Development Studies at Birzeit University and a research associate for the Latin America International Affairs Programme at the LSE Ideas Centre.

Insights into US-Latin American relations through Wikileaks

By Guy Burton

Much of the recent attention to the leaked American diplomatic cables has involved gossip and various unflattering pen portraits of world leaders. In the case of Latin America this has already emerged in relation to Argentine President Cristina Kirchner’s mental state. Today there is the exposure of Bolivia’s President Evo Morales and his tumour treatment which will doutbless be seized upon.

However, what has been overlooked is the extent to which much of the dispatches that have been published to date between Washington and its Latin American missions confirm what we already know – namely its primary concern with regional security and the ambiguous relationship that exists between Washington and much of Latin America.

First, in the case of regional security the US arguably relies on the regional power, Brazil – which itself is the subject of most of the cables so far released. The relationship between the US and Brazil is also significant since it illustrates the scope of American engagement. There is a strong recognition by American officials that there are limits which may be summarised as ‘Friendly Cooperation, But Not Strong Friendship’. This is due to a tension between the more sceptical position towards the US at the top of the Brazilian government and the willingness and level of cooperation within it at the operational level. In January 2008, for example, the US embassy in Brasilia notes the tussle between the defence and foreign affairs ministries over whether to sign a defence cooperation agreement with Washington.  Similarly, although the embassy comments that Brazil’s National Defence Strategy and the decision to restructure its armed forces does coincide with American interests at greater regional security and peacekeeping and offers opportunities for American businesses and armed forces and their counterparts, it has to deal with a publically ambivalent Brazilian government.  This is made explicit in the discussion between the American ambassador and Brazil’s defence minister, Nelson Jobim, that the US-Colombian agreement over American airbases and an Air Force budget memo ‘showed “a complete lack of understanding” of Latin America and said that [Jobim] had to discuss the issue with the President to urge “moderation” from Lula.’ By contrast the ambassador ends with the comment that Brazil’s ‘insistence on painting [Colombian President] Uribe as the primary source of Andean tensions may limit the [Government of Brazil]’s effectiveness’.

American concern with security is also apparent in its preoccupation with regional rivals. First (and not surprisingly) Venezuela features prominently in American communications. For example, in May 2005 the US ambassador to Brazil complains about the role that Venezuela’s president, Hugo Chavez, is playing in preventing Brazilian leadership in the region. In response, his interlocutor, the Minister for Institutional Security, General Jorge Armando Felix, reminds the ambassador that Chavez is ‘very much a part of the “Latin American” reality.’  But while Latin Americans have accept Chavez as part of the scene, it is not apparent that the US is comfortable with this. By 2008 Brazil was proposing to contain Venezuela ‘exporting instability’ by bringing the country into a South American Defence Council, an approach which the embassy commented on as ‘impractical.’ At the same time, the State Department was seeking information on the attitudes of the Paraguayan presidential election candidates towards Venezuela and Cuba and the level of domestic intervention being played by the two in that country.

Second, Washington has become increasingly concerned with external actors in the region, both state and non-state. In terms of state actors, American officials at the State Department have been specifically requesting information on Chinese and Iranian involvement in the region, including military cooperation and communications in Paraguay. With regard to non-state actors, although a number of transnational issues such as the drug trade, arms smuggling and money laundering have been problems in the Tri-Border Region (TBR) between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay since the 1990s, there has been a shift in focus. This reflects a change in American priorities from tackling these transnational issues to countering radical Islam over the past decade, following the 9/11 attacks.

US officials are actively seeking information on the involvement of radical Islamist individuals and organisations, such as Hamas and Hezbollah and their respective links, support networks and funding. At the same time the cables recognise that the issue is no longer contained to the TBR. Instead efforts have to be made to the wider Muslim population in the continent. In Brazil, for example, the US embassy reports greater attention being paid to counter-terrorism measures.  These include greater cooperation to tackle illicit financial transactions and other activities taking place between American and Brazilian law enforcement agencies even while official government rhetoric remains relatively distant.

Despite this involvement, American officials cannot contain their criticism. The American response to the Brazilian government’s lack of concern with passing anti-terrorism legislation is broadly negative. In an April 2008 cable the embassy notes that the proposed bill, which would have treated the participation, financing and support of terrorist groups as a crime, was shelved by Lula’s chief of staff, Djilma Rousseff, on the grounds that it might be used against social groups and movements that support the government.  This has promoted the Americans to seek alternative ways to engage the issue, including the use of outreach activities between its São Paulo consulate and moderate Muslim leaders in the city.

More generally, the nature of American attitudes towards their Latin American counterparts demonstrates a critical, partial and equivocal stance. For example, American analysis of Argentina reveals not only a lack of knowledge about Cristina Kirchner – despite having been in office for nearly two years - but it also echoes the opposition’s criticisms, namely that it is ‘extremely thin-skinned and intolerant of perceived criticism.’  In addition, the US maintains a reputation for being equivocal. The dispatch from its embassy in Honduras a month after last year’s coup illustrates this point neatly. Following the enforced exile of the then president, Manuel Zelaya, the embassy recommends a search to ‘provide a face-saving “out” for the two opposing sides in the current standoff’. On the one hand, this presents the US as standing above the fray. Indeed, at the time of the coup the American position was extremely vocal, with Barack Obama condemning it swiftly. The embassy too criticized Zelaya’s forced exile and the assumption to the presidency of Congress’s speaker, Roberto Micheletti.

On the other hand, the American position was not as virtuous as it appears. That Zelaya was an ally of American rivals such as Venezuela’s president Hugo Chavez and his peers in Ecuador, Cuba and Bolivia may have discouraged more extensive American support. Indeed, the embassy claims that Zelaya may have been partly to blame, by having ‘committed illegalities and may have even violated the constitution.’ This is based on the embassy’s decision to seek out legal advice regarding the constitution and the grounds for presidential removal. Its recommendation to find a solution amenable to both did not therefore mean a return to the presidency for Zelaya, but rather one that removed both Micheletti and Zelaya from the picture. That “out” was achieved at the end of the year when the scheduled presidential election took place, resulting in quick American acceptance of the result even as other Latin American governments continued to protest.

That Washington was looking for a solution in the latter part of last year was no secret. In this regard, along with the detail of the other dispatches so far published does not shake up our fundamental assumptions about American interests, attitudes and actions in Latin America over the past few years. If anything, they merely confirm that Washington pursues its interests throughout the region – regional security, radical Islam, external threats, drug trafficking, arms smuggling and money laundering – and making common cause with those who share them. At the same time, they are extremely useful at revealing the limitations of American influence and that Washington is not able to impose its will on individual countries – even small ones such as Honduras. Finally, the leaked documents are fascinating at providing a contemporary insight into the way that American policymakers view their priorities and concerns in the region, along with their own estimation of their Latin American counterparts. With the publication of further dispatches from the region, the opportunity to analyse the role of Washington and others in the region in greater detail is certainly one not to be missed.

Guy Burton is a research associate for the Latin America International Affairs Programme at the LSE Ideas Centre.

Brazil's 2010 election: personality-based institutionalisation

By Guy Burton

On the surface the result in Brazil’s presidential election was relatively predictable. Both the principal parties’ candidates, Dilma Rousseff of the Workers Party (PT) and the Brazilian Social Democratic Party’s (PSDB) José Serra made it through to the second round. This is the fifth time in a row (out of six direct presidential elections since the return of democracy in the 1980s) that these two parties have taken the top two positions. Moreover, that the PT took first place in the poll highlights the shadow of the outgoing president, Lula da Silva, whose continuing high popularity after eight years in office was transferred to his own chosen successor, Rousseff.

There was also arguably little to choose between the two candidates. Both have broadly similar programmes. Although the two parties may have emerged from the south and São Paulo in particular from different constituencies (the PT in the industrial and working class areas and the PSDB among the middle class and business people), the past decade has seen both broadly committed to the same set of policies designed to increase economic growth and more redistributive social policies. If there is any significant difference it is more to do with style rather the content, the PSDB being slightly more committed to the market than the PT.

Such factors all appear to point to a sense of growing political stability in Brazil. Whoever wins the second round that will take place at the end of October will be confident that they will enjoy a constitutional transfer of power from President Lula to him or herself on 1 January. By contrast, the same cannot be said for other parts of the continent where social tension has manifested itself in political unrest and action in the recent past. This includes an aborted coup attempt in Bolivia in 2008, the overthrow of President Manuel Zelaya in Honduras in June 2009 and last week’s political troubles in Ecuador against President Rafael Correa.

If the Brazilian election result exudes a sense of business as usual, there are political undercurrents which deserve closer scrutiny. First, Rousseff won around 59% of the vote in the Northeast, her highest share of the vote in the poorest part of the country. Meanwhile in the South she and her Serra were almost neck and neck, with around 42% to 44% respectively. This difference in support demonstrates the continuation of a shift in regional voting that occurred in 2006. Until then the bulk of the PT’s vote had been based in the south of the country. Lula’s re-election in 2006 was significant in that much of his support came from the north. What accounted for the change was the introduction of the bolsa familia (family grant), through which the government provided cash conditional transfers to households to support nutrition, children in school and basic utilities. The measure was targeted at the poorest families in Brazil, the majority of them located in the north. The electoral advantage that it gave to the PT was not lost on the PSDB, which committed itself to continuing the programme were it to be elected.

Second, Marina Silva’s 19% for the Green Party was the highest for any third placed candidate since the return of direct presidential elections in 1989. Her result – as well as her presence in the election – was significant for several reasons. At one level, her journey from being an illiterate 16 year old daughter of rubber tappers in Acre state to becoming minister of the environment in Lula’s government echoes the same rise as her former boss and his humble origins from a shoeshine boy and former factory worker, before becoming a trade union leader. For the PT to win her support is important, since it would enable it to claim the mantle of continuity (through her own participation in government) and historical commitment to the poor (through her own life story and association with the party). However, her close association with the environmental movement and politics was increasingly marginalised during Lula’s second term as the Accelerated Growth Programme (PAC) with its various state-funded infrastructure and construction projects began to bite, ultimately resulting in her criticism of the government’s unsustainable development and resignation in 2008. For this reason it is just as important for the PSDB to win Silva over, especially as her strong support in the south (including a quarter of the vote in the Southeast) could help counter the high degree of support for Rousseff (through Lula) in the north.

These features suggest that the coming campaign for the second round will be similar to that from the first round. Already the PT has announced that it will use the next few weeks to emphasise the differences between Lula’s government and that of his predecessor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso of the PSDB, who left office eight years ago. It will emphasise Lula as the father of the poor in the form of the bolsa familia. At the same time it will continue to link Rousseff with Lula while courting Silva publically, including emphasising her background and association with Lula, the social movements and party and the government.

By pursuing this course, the 2010 campaign appears to be leading to a paradoxical political outcome. On one hand the emphasis on candidates’ personalities echoes the populist period, when particular focus was placed on an individual rather than political institutions and parties. This was also a period when historically Latin America was politically unstable, many of the populists succumbing to coups and military rule. On the other hand though, the persistence of the same two parties and their candidates along with the use of now historic figures – i.e. Lula and Cardoso, neither of whom are standing for election – points to an increasing institutionalisation of the Brazilian political system. Could it be then, that the 2010 election may be pointing to a new synthesis where past and present political forms may co-exist, indeed even flourish?

Guy Burton is a research associate for the Latin America International Affairs Programme at the LSE Ideas Centre.

What the World Cup means for Latin America

For much of the past century Latin America has been characterised as Washington’s ‘backyard’. Economically and militarily, the region’s states have never been in a position to compete with the United States while the Cold War provided the backdrop against which governments largely opted for American patronage. The experience of those that opted for a more independent and socially transformative role, such as Cuba and Allende’s Chile, was not a happy one, the former being frozen out and obliged to seek support from Moscow and the latter succumbing to a US-supported coup and repressive military dictatorship.

But one arena where Latin America could compete with the US – indeed, even triumph over it – was on the football field. And with the World Cup due to kick off in South Africa later this week, it is perhaps worth considering the way in which the tournament has been used by the region’s governments to promote themselves globally.

Latin American countries have won half of eighteen World Cups held since the first one in 1930. Brazil holds the record, with five victories, with Argentina and Uruguay both having won it twice each. The political influence was present at the start: Uruguay’s appointment as inaugural hosts by FIFA (the international football body) in 1930 had as much to do with it celebrating its centenary as an independent state as much as it did with being the Olympic champion in 1924 and 1928 (and prior to the World Cup the world championship for the sport).

Brazil, which has always sought a leading international role, applied for the 1942 World Cup. Its main competition came from Germany. However, the Second World War was to interrupt the competition and prevent any competitive football by European teams in this period.

Brazil’s offer was reiterated and taken up after the end of hostilities in 1946. In the absence of any interest from the war-ravaged European countries, Brazil’s bid for the 1950 competition was the only one. The country saw the event as an opportunity to showcase Brazil’s global progress and set about building the largest stadium in the world, the Maracana.

Across the nation there was high confidence that this was to be Brazil’s year. The shock that followed the country’s defeat to Uruguay in the final game of the tournament – and hence the championship for Uruguay’s second and final success – plunged many into a state of grief, including several suicides. Brazil’s defeat was significant on two levels. Politically, it undermined the Brazilian leadership’s belief in itself as the country of the future and of success. In football terms, despite Uruguay’s football and demographic decline compared to Brazil, when the two countries meet the match is subject to acute levels of attention by Brazilians and excessive celebration whenever they win.

Brazil’s defeat in 1950 haunted the nation until it finally achieved its first win in 1958 at the tournament in Sweden. This made Brazil the first – and so far only – nation to win the competition outside of its own hemisphere (repeating the feat in Japan/Korea in 2002). It held onto the trophy in 1962 when the competition was next staged in Latin America, this time in Chile. That Chile was able to host the event was an achievement since much of the stadia, along with the country’s infrastructure had to be rebuilt in the wake of the 1960 earthquake, the largest so far recorded.

With FIFA adopting an alternation of hosts between Europe and South America, the region’s next turn came in 1970 when Mexico hosted the first of its two to date. Already before the tournament opened football had served as a backdrop to conflict between El Salvador and Honduras, dubbed the ‘Football War’. Although neither side qualified for the finals, the matches were played between the two countries amid rising tensions related to increasing migration by Salvadorans to Honduras and their expulsion. A day before the second game was played hostilities began, lasting several days and resulting in no decisive outcome for either side.

A year later when the tournament was finally held, it was considered a classic and was won by arguably the greatest Brazilian side ever produced. Brazil’s victory meant that it had won the competition for the third time, thereby earning it the right to permanent ownership of the original trophy. However, the occasion coincided two with both the rise of military repression and an industrial boom known as the ‘economic miracle’. Linking football success to the latter, the generals in charge sought to divert public attention away from the excesses being carried out. This was apparent in the use of the pro-government football hymn, ‘Go Forward Brazil’.

The same was to follow in an arguably more cynical fashion in 1978. That tournament was held in Argentina and won by the hosts, which had been granted the right to stage the event in 1966. However, during the early 1970s growing political tension had contributed to a ‘dirty war’, resulting in a military coup in 1976. Between 10,000 and 30,000 people disappeared during the seven years of dictatorship. Protest against the military government included a committee to boycott the World Cup which received support in France, West Germany and the Netherlands. However, divisions within the Left, including the Soviet Union’s continued economic links with the regime and a lack of support for the boycott by the Argentine Communist Party, weakened the movement. The regime saw an opportunity to exploit the tournament for its own purposes, spending around US$700m on infrastructure, equal to around 10% of the national debt and postponing non-World Cup related projects during the period.

Colombia was scheduled to host the event in 1986, having won the right in 1974. However, in the years that followed the country became increasingly plagued by internal strife including kidnappings and rising debts. By the early 1980s it was apparent that the country would not be able to provide the infrastructure necessary to host the event. In 1983 the decision was taken to move the competition, with Canada, Brazil, the US and Mexico all presenting bids.

Within one of the strongest applications, the US was rejected on two main grounds: one, FIFA’s opposition to the various rule changes made to the game by the American authorities in their country; and two, FIFA’s commercial priorities. The Mexican vice-president of FIFA not only owned several football clubs and a media company, but also provided the framework for the way the competition is now presented, bringing in sponsors and raising ticket prices to the advantage of the football world body.

Despite winning the right to stage the tournament for a second time, Mexico’s main achievement was not only the pitch but like Chile two decades earlier in actually holding the event. Eight months before the competition began an earthquake struck Mexico City but did not damage the stadia. Most of the games kicked off in the midday heat as to ensure European TV coverage, which was provided by the media company owned by FIFA’s Mexican vice-president. Argentina was the victors for a second time, dispatching England in a quarterfinal against which the recent Falklands/Malvinas conflict served as a backdrop. Although both team managers had sought to downplay the political aspect, Argentine players admitted a degree of satisfaction and revenge in the result.

Following Argentina’s success, Latin American honours have fallen to Brazil twice more, in 1994 and 2002. The 1994 victory was jumped on by the country’s president, who after the country’s economic decline during the ‘Lost Decade’, wanted to transfer the team’s success to the national psyche. The year also saw the introduction of the Real Plan which brought an end to inflation and led to a consumer boom in Brazil – an occasion not lost to the successful team, who returned from the US World Cup with tonnes of products. Similarly in 2002 the then president also sought to link the team’s achievement with the country’s economic recovery.

Since Mexico in 1986, Latin America has not played host to the World Cup, FIFA having opted to bring in other continents including Asia and Africa. However, in 2003 it announced that the 2014 competition would take place in South America. Brazil, Argentina and Colombia all declared their interest, although the South American confederation eventually opted to put its full backing behind Brazil. Its bid was formally accepted in late 2007.

Brazil’s success in winning the bid has echoes with the last time it staged it in 1950, by providing an opportunity for the country to demonstrate the extent to which it has advanced globally (this was further helped by President Lula’s involvement in supporting its successful 2009 bid to stage the Olympic Games two years after the World Cup). But many will hope that this time the result will be different, with Brazil presenting a success on the pitch as well as off it. However, this remains far from certain; earlier this year FIFA put the country on notice, highlighting concern with the slow pace of preparations.

Guy Burton is a research associate for the Latin America International Affairs Programme at the LSE Ideas Centre.