Understanding Iranian Foreign Policy Behaviour

By Juha Saarinen

Since its inception in 1979, the Islamic Republic of Iran has cut across a wide range of Western security concerns. From supporting terrorism, seeking weapons of mass destruction and more recently, supporting armed non-state actors in Afghanistan and Iraq, its recalcitrant theocracy has been viewed as a threat to regional stability. However, despite the plethora of literature written about Western policies vis-à-vis Iran, Iranian foreign policy remains poorly understood. Instead of clear analysis, there are considerable amounts of sensationalistic coverage about Iran's nuclear ambitions and about “mad mullahs” driven by apocalyptic delusions and a martyr complex. Arguably, understanding Iran's foreign policy is central to crafting sensible and effective policies and requires a closer examination of the historic, domestic, and regional contexts of Iranian foreign policy behaviour transcending Western perspectives and concerns.

Relevance of history

For Iran, the past is always present. On the one hand, ordinary Iranians have a strong connection even with their remote past, repeating ancient poetry, folktales and ceremony, and reaffirming their cultural heritage. Additionally, they take pride in the continuity of their cultural identity over millennia, and in having influenced the Greek, Arab, Mongol, and Turkish civilizations and Western culture through Iranian contributions to Islamic civilization.

At the same time, however, Iranians have a deep-seated scar in their collective psyche emanating from oppression by foreign powers throughout their history. Greeks, Arabs, Mongols, Turks, and most recently Saddam Hussein's forces all invaded Iranian homeland. Likewise, Iranians also remember the British and Russian empires’ economic exploitation, political subjugation, invasion and occupation in both World Wars. Moreover, the impact of the coup d’état against democratically elected Mossadegh in 1953 and the return of the autocratic Shah to the throne, and subsequent perceived American domination of Iran for a quarter century is seared into Iran's collective memory.

This paradoxical combination of historical awareness, cultural pride, and a sense of victimization at the hand of foreign powers, has created a passionate sense of independence and a culture of resistance to domination by any foreign power, as well as a deep desire to re-establish a ‘natural’ Iranian regional hegemony among the Iranian people. The four fundamental principles of Iranian foreign policy - rejection of all forms of external domination, preservation of Iran’s independence and territorial integrity, defence of the rights of all Muslims without allying with hegemonic power, and the maintenance of peaceful relations with all non-belligerent states - are rooted in these widely held sentiments.

Iranian statecraft

Contrary to some Western depictions of Iranian foreign policy as irrational and contradictory, Tehran's foreign policy has its own strategic logic steeped in its particular idiosyncrasies. Formulated not by “mad mullahs” but by calculating Ayatollahs, Iran’s contemporary behaviour is a far cry from its revolutionary zenith in the 1980’s when its main objective was to export the revolution through provocation, agitation, subversion, and terrorism.

In the post-Khomeini era, Tehran’s top priority has been the survival of the Islamic Republic. It views the United States as an existential threat and to counter this threat Iran devised a strategy that rests on both deterrence and competition in the Middle East, and increasingly looks to non-western states for political and economic cooperation. In this context, China, India and Russia emerged as strategically important partners. According to its strategy, Tehran balances between deterring any possible military actions by the United States and its allies – largely by improving its retaliatory capabilities both inside and outside the country – and neutralizing Western attempts to contain it, as well as undermining U.S. interests and increasing its own power in the wider Middle East.

Yet, to many external observers Iran’s behaviour remains fundamentally enigmatic. On the one hand, this can be partly attributed to the ambiguities in the Iranian political system. Far from being a unitary actor, Iran seems like a country of a thousand power centres, with its political networks and affiliations resting upon personal connections rather than an institutional framework, with layers of complexity and contradictions beneath the surface of its political system. Indeed, political factionalism and friction in Iran’s political system emanating from the competition for power between its Islamic and republican institutions, at times, causes oscillation between ideological and pragmatic concerns in its foreign policy.

On the other hand, the imprudence in Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric, especially regarding Israel and the Holocaust, hardly reinforces the image of pragmatic Iran. On the contrary, it invites comparison between Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy and revolutionary Khomeinism of the 1980’s. However, such analogies overestimate the role and influence of the President in Iranian foreign policy. Indeed, while there have been considerable differences in the foreign policies of Rafsanjani, Khatami and Ahmadinejad, Iran’s foreign policy has had considerable continuity through Supreme Leader Khamene’i whose authority supersedes that of the President’s Office. More importantly, however, such analogies grossly underestimate the impact of regional geopolitics.

Geopolitics

A close analysis of Iran's actions in the region shows that in the post-Khomeini era, Iran has shifted its policies to securing the revolution within its borders rather than exporting it. Where its immediate security is concerned, Tehran has come to focus on geopolitical factors over ideological concerns. However, ideology remains an important part of its foreign policy where it has little security implications.

Adjacent to its borders, Iran’s foreign policy has been mainly influenced by strategic concerns. Facing sectarian conflict and fragile states outside its borders, Iran's domestic characteristics, its ethnic politics and cultural-religious identity, and its national security have become inextricably tied to that of the region. The Global War on Terror, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the post-invasion landscape have only served to intensify this complex security interdependence.

In Afghanistan, Iran’s strategic goal has remained unchanged for the last nine years. Most importantly it has aimed to prevent Afghanistan from being used as a platform for attacks, concurrently maximizing its own influence. It has included isolating Iran from threats that undermine the Islamic Republic and its domestic stability, and negating potential threats to Iran’s standing as a regional power. Subsequently, Tehran has formed and cultivated relationships with Shi’a Hazara and other Dari/Persian-speaking communities who could keep Iran’s Afghan enemies and their external supporters in check and use them as a counterweight to anti-Iranian, pro-Saudi, and pro-Pakistani elements among Afghan Pashtuns.

Iran's strategic priorities in post-invasion Iraq have been equally continuous. Establishing a friendly, preferably Shiite government with the capacity to impose and maintain order – albeit too weak to challenge Iran’s hegemonic aspirations – has been Tehran’s main objective. It has opposed the Balkanization of Iraq, fearing that such fragmentation would incite secessionism and fragmentation. Additionally, Tehran has actively sought to eliminate, or at least balance pro-Saudi and pro-Pakistani elements operating in Iraq. Similar to Afghanistan, Tehran has sought to achieve its goals through cultivating relations with several factions in Iraq’s Shi’a majority.

However, in the Levant, where there have been less direct security consequences, Iranian behaviour has been more heavily influenced by ideological factors, seeing a partnership forming between local armed non-state actors and Tehran. The strategic rationale behind Tehran’s regional policy vis-à-vis the Levant has been to increase its Islamic credentials, to compete with Saudi Arabia over Lebanon, and to maintain an irregular capacity to challenge Israel and America through supporting Hezbollah, and to a lesser extent, Hamas. Indeed, in the Levant, supporting the armed non-state actors presented Iran with an opportunity to cultivate cooperation with actors who share its foreign policy principles, approach to American influence over the region, and disdain toward the policies of Arab regimes, especially vis-a-vis the Middle East Peace Process. Somewhat ironically, the conflicts that occurred in the region have largely facilitated Iranian regional influence and increased its prestige. Supporting armed non-state actors in the Levant provided invaluable strategic partnerships in a region where Iran and its behaviour are largely met with suspicion and containment, and with little risk of Israeli or American retaliation, Iranian support for these groups has been more robust than in Afghanistan or Iraq.

The Revolutionary Myth

Although the many stereotypes of Iranian foreign policy persist, and are likely to do so for the near future, they should not continue to go unchallenged. There is hardly a ‘one-size-fits-all approach’ when it comes to Iranian foreign policy, which the ‘mad mullah’ paradigm relies upon, nor is Iran a unitary actor run by a cohesive foreign policy elite. Indeed, Tehran’s foreign policy has an undeniable logic that cannot be divorced from Iran’s cultural, political and historical idiosyncrasies, or the impact of regional geopolitical dynamics.

During the Global War on Terror, Tehran has shown itself to be acutely aware of the geopolitical dynamics of the wider Middle East, which has allowed it to increase its stature mainly by reacting to regional events and American misunderstanding of regional dynamics, Iran’s intentions and behaviour largely facilitated Iranian presence. While there has been considerable variation in Iranian foreign policy between ideological and pragmatic elements, it has been the geopolitical context that has mainly determined Iranian behaviour. In Afghanistan and Iraq on the one hand, and the Levant on the other, Iran’s policies have been considerably different simply because they present very different challenges and opportunities to Tehran. Its objectives, strategies and concerns have been somewhat different in each case, leading to different approaches which fit into the fundamental principles in Iran’s foreign policy.

Fundamentally, there is a significant need for Western policy-makers and analysts alike to better understand Iran, especially when facing potential clash over Tehran’s speculated nuclear weapons program. Indeed, Iran’s many idiosyncrasies need to be considered and embedded in the analysis of Tehran's foreign policy behaviour, or the underlying rationale guiding its behaviour will likely go unseen, severely crippling the ability to develop an effective long-term strategy toward Iran.

Juha Saarinen holds a Master of Letters in Middle Eastern and Central Asian Studies from the University of St. Andrews, and he currently studies at LSE for a Master of Science in International Relations, with a research focus on Strategic Studies and Political Violence in the Middle East.

Shifting Sands is the blog of the Middle East International Affairs Programme at LSE IDEAS, analysing current events in the Middle East and contributing to the ongoing deliberations over policy prescriptions.

Amber Holewinski, Editor

Fire Under the Ashes: A Year After Iran’s Troubled Elections

By Adel Al Toraifi

As some analysts expected, the anniversary of the Iranian elections passed with neither huge protests in the streets nor any prominent events taking place. Except for some student arrests and an individual attack against the former presidential candidate Mehdi Karroubi, the Iranian regime proved that it is the master of the situation. This reality was made clear when leaders of the opposing green movement backed down from organizing protests days before the anniversary and instead apologized out of fear of security measures taken by the Iranian regime. Perceived as a serious weakness by their supporters, members of the opposition have decreased in number.

Some attribute reasons for the green movement's retreat to the success of the Iranian authorities backed particularly by the revolutionary guard and the Basij militia in the forced reelection of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Also, a series of trials, sentences and executions against supporters of the opposition under the noses of its leaders—Rafsanjani, Mousavi, Khatami, and Karroubi—proved that opposition to the existing regime is still weak and ineffective in changing the situation in the Iranian political arena. In this context, the political analyst Reza Esfandiari commented in the Telegraph (12 June), "Despite the claims of a rigged poll, all of the available evidence indicates to [the election] being authentic and that a majority of Iranians support the current government.” He went on to say that "The failure of the Green (reformist) movement one year on is largely down to the fact that it could not draw among ordinary Iranians outside of the political elite and cosmopolitan social base."

However, others see that the apparent calm conceals much anger and internal congestion, or as The New York Times called it in a 12 June report, “fire under the ashes." The report indicates that the Supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad may appear victorious at this stage, but many people in Iran today feel that—despite the apparent retreat of the green movement—underground opposition not directly associated with the movement is growing, and it is distinguishing itself from both the existing political regime and its opponents. If this is true, then the conservative and reformist parties have lost their chance to challenge the serious imbalance of power in the Iranian political system. In effect, the revolution that represented the people has become a regime that forcefully controls a youth nation that was born after the revolution.

While the neo-conservatives in Iran enjoy their victory over the internal opposition, Iran has become internationally isolated similar to the post-revolution years; the major countries passed a fourth package of sanctions with the concurrence of Iran's friends: Russia and China. Though the Iranian government appears negligent to these strategic losses, the country—according to some observers—may face major economic challenges domestically.

During 2007 and 2008, Iran gained significant income from its oil returns, and the peak of the oil prices ($150) helped the central government cover its gross expenditures in projects supporting the poor who, in fact, form the public base of President Ahmadinejad. However, Iran is facing an economic blockade that may harm its foreign trade. In 2008, Tehran's trade with its five biggest Asian trading partners reached about one billion dollars. The majority of Iran's exports go to countries such as the United Arab Emirates, Iraq and Afghanistan, but the value of this trade is likely to decrease to 2001 rates, less than $500 million, if these sanctions are implemented more strictly than before.

In his important book Forces of Fortune (2009), Vali Nasr argues, "The great battle for Iran's soul –and the future of the whole region – will be fought not over religion or sects, but over the freedom of trade and capitalism." Thus, the economic sanctions imposed on Iran will have significant consequences. Iran's gross domestic product, now, is similar to that of Massachusetts. Experts argue that Iran’s economic status prevents Iran from being a major player regionally, let alone confronting countries such as the United States or the European Union.

The neo-conservatives in Iran argue that acquiring nuclear technology – not necessarily possessing a nuclear weapons arsenal – is essentially a response to the foreign threats they face, and that the western countries, especially those in the region, will have to correct their stances and acknowledge Iran's status as a major country. It is true that reaching a nuclear capability may change the balance of power in the region. Nevertheless, it will change nothing in the balance of the internal dispute. Ray Takeyh (Guardians of the Revolution, 2009) points out that the extreme rightist policies of the Mullahs in coalition with the guards [Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps] may have ensured their success in the regional conflict with the international community, but the domestic challenges might be the greatest threat to their existence in power. Eventually, failing to solve domestic problems was the main reason behind the fall of countries such as the Soviet Union.

The neo-conservatives may have succeeded in this round, but as a Persian proverb states, "Forgiveness hides a pleasure not found in revenge." It is a lesson they don’t realize clearly; Iran will never be as it was before, as anger and revenge are still burning under the ashes.

Adel Al Toraifi is a political analyst and researcher, based in London. His area of specialty is Saudi foreign policy and Iranian politics. Al Toraifi is a PhD candidate in the International Relations Department at LSE.

Shifting Sands is the blog of the Middle East International Affairs Programme at LSE IDEAS, analysing current events in the Middle East and contributing to the ongoing deliberations over policy prescriptions.

Amber Holewinski, Editor

Turkey and Israel: The End of the Affair?

By Christopher Phillips

As the dust from Israel’s 31st May attack on a Gaza-bound Turkish aid ship continues to settle, and the various sides push their own accounts of who violated which international laws and protocols, one thing is for certain: Turkish-Israeli relations are in dire straits. Despite a long history of friendship, tensions between the two have been simmering since Tel Aviv’s sudden invasion of Gaza in December 2008, further exacerbated by Israel’s public humiliation of Turkey’s ambassador and Ankara’s improving ties with the Jewish state’s enemies in Tehran and Damascus. However, the events 77 miles off the coast of Gaza, in which 4 Turks were amongst the 9 activists killed, has brought matters to a new low with Turkish PM Erdogan declaring the raid a ‘massacre’ and recalling his ambassador to Tel Aviv. So why has this decline come about?

Commentators in the pro-Israel camp have been quick to blame Ankara’s hostility on the Islamist roots of Turkey’s ruling AKP party. According to this narrative, the AKP, angry at continual rejection by the EU, is turning its attention eastwards to recast Turkey in the Ottoman role of dominant power in the Middle East. One writer, the Dayan Centre’s Joshua Teitelbaum, even went far enough to accuse Erdogan of waging ‘Jihad’ on Israel. Yet such analysis is severely flawed. The AKP have been in power since 2002 and, until the Gaza war of 2008, enjoyed excellent relations with Israel: extending military and economic cooperation and mediating Tel Aviv’s peace talks with Syria. Certainly no such Islamist ideological opposition to Israel was visible in those first six years.

Similarly Turkey has in no way turned its back on Europe. The EU remains Turkey’s principal trading partner, an economic relationship that has prompted the unprecedented growth that is allowing Ankara greater financial clout in the Middle East. Far from an Islamic idealism, Turkish foreign relations under the AKP has been characterised by a flexible realism. Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s notion of ‘zero problems with neighbours’ has allowed Ankara to maintain and indeed strengthen its ties with Europe whilst abandoning historical hostilities with Russia, Greece, Syria and Iran in order to enhance Turkey’s influence in its surrounding countries.

The decline in relations with Tel Aviv is therefore better explained by Israel’s bizarrely provocative behaviour towards Turkey, rather than a renewed Islamic idealism in Ankara. Indeed, until recently Israel too could be considered a neighbour with which Turkey had ‘zero problems’, as illustrated by the first six years of AKP-Israel harmony. Yet Israel has seemed foolishly insensitive to Turkish national pride in its recent actions. Erdogan felt personally betrayed, for example, in 2008 when he had spent hours mediating a potential peace deal between Tel Aviv and Damascus, only for then Israeli Premier Olmert to scupper the talks by launching the Gaza invasion without any consultation with Ankara. Similarly current Israeli Foreign Officials deliberately humiliated the Turkish ambassador in 2009 by making him sit in a ‘low chair’ during a televised interview, prompting public outrage in Turkey. Now, following the flotilla crisis, despite Israel’s pleas that they had asked Ankara not to sanction the convoy, four bodies returned home to Turkey who had been shot at point-blank range by their government’s supposed ally - a difficult position for any leader to justify to an angry nationalist population.

Yet these actions point to a wider trend in the Middle East on behalf of both actors. For Israel, it displays an even greater siege mentality than usual under the stewardship of Premier Netanyahu and Foreign Minister Lieberman. This government’s willingness to discard any international criticism whether it be over the Gaza blockade or stolen western identities to assassinate Hamas leaders in Dubai, and their direct refusal of US wishes to halt West Bank settlements, suggests a leadership convinced of its own rectitude and steadfast refusal to compromise, whatever the costs to its international image. In this light, losing its oldest and most important Muslim ally is a price it seems strangely willing to pay.

For Turkey, we see an emerging regional power that has less and less need of an ally whose actions are increasingly indefensible. In the end, Israel is a tiny market of 6 million consumers, whilst the Arab and Muslim Middle East offer much more. Ankara, one suspects, would rather not have to choose, but conversely, Erdogan will be aware of his rising star in the Middle East as a champion of the Palestinians – even if his primary motivation remains Turkish national interests.

As such trends continue, Israel should be cautious not to disregard Turkey’s importance. This is no powerless Arab dictatorship but a thriving, militarily strong, democratic regional giant. Moreover, Western states, notably the US, have long looked to Turkey as its role model in the Muslim World: proof that Islam and democracy can be compatible. At the final analysis, Tel Aviv should understand that, from a realist perspective that ignores the power of domestic lobbies and sentimental attachments, Turkey is far more important to American and European long-term objectives in the Middle East than Israel is. The last thing Tel Aviv should do is to deliberately provoke circumstances whereby the West has to choose.

Christopher Phillips is a PhD student in International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science and Programme Assistant on the IDEAS Middle East International Affairs Programme.

Shifting Sands is the blog of the Middle East International Affairs Programme at LSE IDEAS, analysing current events in the Middle East and contributing to the ongoing deliberations over policy prescriptions.

Amber Holewinski, Editor

A Decade for the Israeli Withdrawal from Lebanon: How Much Has Changed?

By Yaniv Voller

Ten years ago, in May 2000, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) withdrew from Lebanon after almost two decades of military control over South Lebanon and ended direct political interference in Lebanese political affairs.

The IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon, popularly described as Israel’s Vietnam, was perceived by commentators to bring a radical change to the region’s geopolitics. Some, particularly in Israel and outside of the Middle East, saw the withdrawal as yet another phase in the ongoing peace agreements between Israel and its neighbours and a necessary step toward a comprehensive peace agreement with Lebanon. But those remained a minority amidst sceptics on both the Israeli and the Arab side.

For many in Israel, and particularly those in the military circles and the right wing parties, the withdrawal meant the loss of Israel’s deterrent force vis-à-vis its enemies in the region. The combination of the withdrawals’ hasty and chaotic nature, the fact that it was done overnight and two months before the planned withdrawal date in order to surprise Hezbollah and to avoid Israeli casualties (perhaps the only success of the withdrawal), and the abrupt collapse of Israel’s long-time proxy, the South Lebanese Army, all served to further the beliefs Israelis who viewed the withdrawal as a colossal defeat. Retired senior officers, commentators and MPs predicted that soon Hezbollah, the Palestinians and the Syrians would use the opportunity to attack Israel in its weakness. They also predicted that South Lebanon would soon become a front between Israel and Iran –the state now free to position its armed forces in “Hezbollah-land.” Those who warned against the withdrawal were further vindicated when the Second Intifada erupted in the occupied territories less than four months after the withdrawal, Hezbollah kidnapped three Israeli soldiers and attacked Israel (marking the beginning of the summer 2006 war).

On the other hand, Arab commentators saw the IDF withdrawal as a cosmetic operation which provided an excuse for Israel to use excessive force against its enemies and an opportunity to dodge a peace agreement with Syria and the Palestinians. Indeed, for these commentators as well, the Israeli operations in Lebanon in 2006 and in Gaza in 2008 were perceived as an Israeli effort to regain its deterrent power.

Yet, a brief review of the last decade reveals that, at least in the short term, the withdrawal has had no significant implications on regional geopolitics. In fact, most regional developments perceived as a direct outcome of the withdrawal are better attributed to internal state dynamics rather than changes due to the withdrawal. Firstly, when it comes to deterrent power, Israel still acts as a regional superpower – yet it cannot handle guerrilla fighting and popular uprising, as evidenced by the Palestinian Intifadas or Hezbollah’s guerrilla attacks. In other words, Israel began losing its deterrent power before the withdrawal, when it proved incapable of containing the first Palestinian Intifada or preventing Hezbollah from shelling Israeli border towns. The Second Palestinian Intifada, erupted not because of Israel’s loss of deterrent power – but because the Palestinians realised that Israel could not be defeated militarily or by diplomatic means – as happened in the First Intifada. Hezbollah’s attacks on Israel indicate an improvement in Hezbollah’s capabilities more than they indicate greater boldness from its side. These attacks served those within Israel who argued that the withdrawal would lead to Hezbollah’s strengthening – but such an argument means ignoring the fact that Israel never controlled the whole of Lebanon – and that Hezbollah could obtain and store weapons in other parts of Lebanon. Finally, Israel’s withdrawal indeed brought with it some immediate political gains for Hezbollah including widespread support in Arab public opinion as the first Arab force to defeat Israel. Yet, even this achievement has been eroded as Hezbollah has been increasingly perceived by large segments of the Arab public as an Iranian proxy in an Arab state.

On the other hand, the withdrawal did not change much in Israel’s regional security conception. The IDF may have learned tactical lessons from the withdrawal, but Israel’s defense policies remain the same. Israel’s attacks on Lebanon and the Gaza strip, though devastating, reflect some rational calculation and some consideration of international public opinion, rather than being only a desperate move to regain deterrence power (here it should be clear that albeit being utterly destructive, both offences in Lebanon and Gaza, the IDF did not use its full military capabilities).

Hence, whereas Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982 had a dramatic impact on the geopolitics of the region, its withdrawal from Lebanon seems to have had an effect mainly within Israel and Lebanon. Of course, time may unfold further implications of this action – but at least for now it seems as though it has been overestimated.

Yaniv Voller is a second year PhD student at the London School of Economics and is interested in secessionism, legitimacy and recognition, non-state actors, Iraq, and Turkey. He is also a graduate teaching assistant in the International History department at the LSE.

Shifting Sands is the blog of the Middle East International Affairs Programme at LSE IDEAS, analysing current events in the Middle East and contributing to the ongoing deliberations over policy prescriptions.

Amber Holewinski, Editor

Iran: Where The Power Lies

By Kevork Oskanian

Since the days of the Islamic Revolution, and certainly since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, Iran’s clerical elite has included a variety of factions – broadly classified as reformist, pragmatist, conservative and radical. For a long time, many in the West pinned their hopes for change on a shift in the balance of power in favour of the first two – the reformists and pragmatists. During the presidency of Mohammed Khatami, there was a palpable sense that a shift in emphasis from the theocratic towards the democratic aspects of the institutional structures of the Islamic Republic would be possible. However, any such hopes were soon dashed by the dominance of conservatives and radicals within the regime’s theocratic arm.

The Supreme Leader Khamenei – himself considered a conservative – has over the past few years gradually moved from acting as a supreme arbiter over the different factions, towards openly wielding partisan political power himself, by overtly supporting Ahmadinejad in the aftermath of the 2009 election. With the increasingly brutal suppression of the Green Movement – including arrests of establishment figures and pressures on Rafsanjani, a pragmatic regime insider previously deemed ‘untouchable’ – it seems the limited pluralism that has marked Iran in the past few decades will become even more constrained. This could finally remove any pretence of democratic rule and dramatically reduce any realistic prospect for peaceful – or violent - change. In effect, the Supreme Leader has moved from being a power-broker to being a power-holder. With much of his legitimacy gone (at least in large parts of the urban middle class), he will have to rely much more on the raw power of cooptation and repression to realise his prime objective: the maintenance of the Islamic Republic and, of course, his own position within it.

During the past year, two elements have kept alive the hopes of those who are aiming for an overhaul of the country’s political system. Firstly, there is the loss of legitimacy of the clergy – including Khamenei – among large parts of the urban, middle-class population. Its most blatant expression was, perhaps, the willingness of protestors to use slogans against the Supreme Leader similar to those used against the Shah in the run-up to the 1979 revolution. Secondly, the chairmanship of the pragmatic Rafsanjani on two crucial clerical bodies: the body overseeing the Supreme Leader’s performance – the Assembly of Experts (with a theoretical constitutional authority to remove Khamenei), and the Expediency Council (an advisory body to the Supreme Leader). The hope here was, of course, that Rafsanjani could become the focus for change within the crucial theocratic arm of Khomeini’s republic. Yet, in both cases, such hopes have been misplaced. Yes, the legitimacy of Iran’s political system, which was up to now partially shored up by a democratic façade, seems to be withering away fast. However, rather than heralding the imminent collapse or fundamental transformation of the regime, this means stability will be increasingly based on the Supreme Leader’s control of a modern-day Praetorian Guard – the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC or Pasdaran), and Iran’s de-facto social-security network – the Islamic Foundations or Bonyads.

The loss of legitimacy of the Supreme Leader is partially offset by his (and Ahmadinejad’s) continued authority in the more conservative countryside, and among the urban poor. But more importantly, Khamenei’s authority over the IRGC remains largely unaffected; he has used his powers of appointment and promotion within the Pasdaran to staff its officers’ corps with ‘ideologically reliable’ elements. And the commanders of the IGRC have duly made it clear that they would be prepared to use force to uphold the institutional integrity of the Islamic Republic. As the IRGC also controls strategically important sections of the Iranian economy, appointments within it have also given the Supreme Leader an opportunity for economic cooptation and elite patronage. Khamenei’s economic cooptative power is furthermore enhanced through his control of the all-important Islamic Foundations – the Bonyads – that control up to 20% of the Iranian economy and that have in recent years supplanted the state as the primary purveyors of social security (and social mobility) for the Iranian poor, through a network of clientelism and corruption.

Control over the IRGC and the Bonyads has therefore given Khamenei the crucial sticks and carrots with which to control both the elite and wider society in the absence of more ‘spontaneous’ forms of authority and legitimacy. The recent ‘suspension’ of two major, previously legal opposition groups – the Mujahedin of the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Iran Participation Front – indicates the regime is indeed moving towards more blatant repression of reformist factions now deemed a threat to national security. Various pressures exerted on Rafsanjani, including the arrest of family members, seem designed to push and/or lure the (wealthy and allegedly corrupt) cleric back into the fold. Further economic sanctions by the outside world will certainly serve to enhance this consolidation of power among the hardliners. In any case, it seems Khamenei has both the ability and the willingness to employ the levers of power at his disposal in order to safeguard the system, and his position within it; the protestors’ menacing chants will merely have served as a reminder of the Shah’s fateful indecisiveness in 1978-79.

Kevork Oskanian is a PhD Candidate at the LSE Department of International Relations.

Shifting Sands is the blog of the Middle East International Affairs Programme at LSE IDEAS, analysing current events in the Middle East and contributing to the ongoing deliberations over policy prescriptions.

Amber Holewinski, Editor

Iraq: What happens when America pulls out?

Welcome to the Shifting Sands blog at LSE IDEAS. We invite PhD students and academics from throughout the UK and abroad to analyse current events in the Middle East and add to the ongoing deliberations over policy prescriptions. Our next contributor, Yaniv Voller, explores the implications of America’s full withdrawal from Iraq.

We look forward to exploring both regional and topical issues relating to current events.
Amber Holewinski, Editor, LSE IDEAS Middle East International Affairs Programme Blog

Iraq after America Leaves

By Yaniv Voller

Predicting the future is not an easy task. Nevertheless, Iraq’s political history provides some insights which might allow us to assess its post-American occupation future and provide at least one possible scenario.

As gloomy as it may sound, this writer believes that it will get worse – at least for the Iraqi people. It seems as though Nouri al-Maliki is taking the notorious part of the Iraqi dictator, relying on manipulation of sectarian and tribal loyalties, a weak party structure to boost his network of patronage, and a personal paramilitary committed to certain sects/regions. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that Maliki, or anyone else, can be cruel as Saddam Hussein – but the possibility of yet another dictator in Baghdad seems very plausible.

In fact, Iraq’s history offers no other alternative to dictatorship. It is not a matter of culture – but rather the fragile composition of the Iraqi population: sectarianism and tribalism have been played for almost a decade by the different governments in Baghdad and the tradition of patronage is embedded in the Iraqi political system. It is too easy and too tempting for a ruler to succumb to dictatorship, particularly one in the position of Maliki, who is striving to gain more power in the periphery to take advantage of this system.

Indeed, there are some alternatives. One which is espoused by scholars and practitioners, as well the Kurdish leadership in northern Iraq, is a federacy. Nonetheless, a weak Baghdad means that this federacy might end up as a confederacy, where the different components have no loyalty to the idea of an integrated Iraq and to the idea of Iraqi nationality. From confederacy, the road to Iraq’s disintegration is short. Although some may welcome such an event, it would only cause chaos and further resentment in a region already torn apart by the Shiite-Sunni and Arab/Turkish-Kurdish divides.

Another alternative is the Lebanese-style confessional system. According to such a system, every position in the government administration will be allocated according to sectarian affiliation – where the Shiites, for example, have the premiership, Kurds the presidency and Sunnis the Ministry of defence. In fact, the current Iraqi system is a de facto confessional system, with senior positions already allotted based on ethnic and religious lines. The institutionalisation of this system has been advocated fervently since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, either by those who perceive it as necessary to compensate the Sunnis for their loss of power, or by those who believe that such a system would represent more justly the Shi’a majority. However, if any lesson can be drawn from the Lebanese case, it is that this system does not work: it is too enticing for both internal and external forces to manipulate such a system. The system perpetuates artificial animosities as well as sectarian affiliation – which are the last things that a nation trying to rebuild itself needs. Furthermore, the confessional system is far from meritocratic, as positions are used as means to appease rather than used to build viable state institutions. Functioning state institutions are integral to saving Iraq.

Indeed, a viable federal system, which will compromise Baghdad’s power but will preserve the idea of an Iraqi nation, is a blessed idea. But it requires a brave leader, free of sectarian loyalties and committed to the idea of the Iraqi nation. A leader who knows that by giving up on Kirkuk, for instance, he or she might give the Kurdish people the hope of being safe in their homeland as Iraqi citizens who are proud of their Kurdish heritage; that is aware of the fact that the Sunnis feel threatened by the growing Iranian influence, even if it is only an imagined one; and that the Shiites deserve compensation for years of marginalisation. Nouri al-Maliki has proven to not be this kind of leader.

The nightmarish scenarios, in which either the Ba’th or al-Qaeda overtake Iraq as soon as the Americans leave, seem quite farfetched. Even the threat of growing Iranian influence on Iraq seems less plausible now, though Maliki has proven that Iran is his natural supporter. So we are left with yet another tyrant – and with a torn apart, miserable Iraqi people. It might be good in the short run, at least from a regional perspective – but it is a recipe for instability and disaster in the long term.

Yaniv Voller is a second year PhD student at the London School of Economics and is interested in secessionism, legitimacy and recognition, non-state actors, Iraq, and Turkey. He is also a graduate teaching assistant in the International History department at the LSE.

Next Week: Saudi Arabia: What are the effects of the global financial crisis on Saudi Arabia's economic prospects?

Iran: What is the effect of more sanctions on domestic Iranian politics?

Welcome to the Middle East International Affairs (MEIA) blog at LSE IDEAS. We invite PhD students and academics from throughout the UK and abroad to analyse current events in the Middle East and add to the ongoing deliberations over policy prescriptions. Our next contributors, Adel Al Toraifi and Gregorio Bettiza, examine the implications of new sanctions on Iran as the US, Britain, France and Germany consider a fourth round of UN sanctions.

We look forward to exploring both regional and topical issues relating to current events.
Amber Holewinski, Editor, LSE IDEAS Middle East International Affairs Programme Blog


Don’t sanction the people!
Why current proposals for sanctions against Iran can do more harm than good.

By Adel Al Toraifi

A diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear programme is certainly the most desirable outcome. However, it seems that the chances for such a resolution are diminishing by time, to the extent that rumours of a possible US or Israeli air-strike on Iranian nuclear facilities has become a weekly routine in the current media for the past year. The debate over the issue has spanned now more than six years, three of them in which Iran has continued publicly to defy the UNSC Resolution 1696 ban on its uranium enrichment programme. A fourth round of sanctions proposed by members of the six nations has not even been agreed upon despite a year of negotiations. China and Russia have been stalling the approval of further sanctions due to their economic interests with Iran; nevertheless both states have demonstrated some pressure on Iran to comply with UNSC resolutions. Lately, the improvement of Russian-US relations has proven to be productive, as Russia refused to set a delivery date regarding its arms deal to sell the sophisticated S-300 anti-aircraft system to Iran.

Perhaps the biggest obstacle in the face of new sanctions is China. The Chinese government has continuously opposed any new sanction on Iran and its position could determine the fate of the proposed sanctions. China has pledged to retaliate for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and warns Sino-U.S. ties will suffer further when President Barack Obama and the Dalai Lama meet - as expected - later this month. Nevertheless, U.S. officials and China experts believe Beijing - despite heated anti-U.S. rhetoric of recent days - will not stand in the way.

Now, the crucial question is not whether the six nations would manage to sanction Iran or not, but how important this step would be?

The current proposal, discussed in New York last month, would most likely target Iranian shipping companies that have violated the UN arms embargo. They would also likely bar nations and international lenders, such as the World Bank, from giving Iran any grants, loans or other financial aid, except for humanitarian or development purposes. Moreover, the sanctions would also target Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). According to the Council on Foreign Relations' report titled Iran's Revolutionary Guards (June 2009), the IRGC has evolved into one of the country's most influential domestic institutions. It controls strategic industries, commercial services and black-market enterprises.

Proponents of the current sanctions proposal say that they simply need to be stronger, but a tougher sanctions regime has a number of problems. First, it will take yet more time to adopt any new measures and, with each passing day, Iran’s program advances. Many experts already believe Iran can now build a bomb and the point of no return has passed. Second, sanctions have already been in place for decades and have not stopped Iran’s progress. The current sanctions have proven ineffective because a number of countries have undermined them, with recent talks between Iranian and Brazilian officials on a Biofuel project as a clear example.

Perhaps the most significant problem with the idea of sanctions is that, as Mitchell Bard recently noted, “it gives the impression of action without really achieving anything.” This is true, despite UN, US and EU sanctions over the years, the Iranian regime has not changed course. New sanctions would mostly target the ordinary population more than it will harm the Ayatollahs. These measures tend to undermine the fact that half of the Iranian economy and civil services are owned or run directly by the same people and institutions it wants to punish. The fallout of the 2009 elections has proven to be an important force for positive change the country, and the policy of “wait and see” by the West, though passive, has denied the conservatives in Iran from using one of the most effective tools in the hand of the regime, blaming the West.

Any meddling in the current situation could easily swing the pendulum to the other side. The international community should demonstrate its will for halting proliferation of nuclear programmes; nevertheless, imposing more sanctions at this stage might aid those whom were responsible of violating the NPT treaty in the first place.

Adel Zaid Al Toraifi is a political analyst and researcher, based in London. His area of specialty is International Relations, concentrating on Middle Eastern affairs: Saudi foreign policy and Iranian politics.

--------------------------------------
Sanctioning Iran, what for?

By Gregorio Bettiza

The question often asked about America implementing further sanctions on Iran, is whether these sanctions will work. But this is the wrong question. The issue is not whether sanctions themselves will succeed or not in curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, in fact they will not. The real issue is, what will the Obama administration decide to use sanctions for.

If sanctions are simply intended to pressure Iran into abandoning its nuclear program, these will be futile. Iran has proven resistant to multiple previous rounds. Indeed, financial and trade restrictions so far have not stopped Iran from enriching uranium or building secret nuclear facilities. If instead sanctions are intended to weaken the Iranian regime and strengthen the opposition, in the hope for a more favourable deal, this is wishful thinking. In fact, sanctions are likely to empower the regime, not undermine it. In most other cases (i.e. Cuba, Iraq, North Korea, Myanmar, Sudan) they have done exactly that, entrenching governing elites while these pass on the costs to the population.

Since sanctions alone will not work, Obama could consider using them as a symbolic gesture of last resort before military action would be seriously taken into consideration. Accompanied by the threat of intervention, sanctions may gain some traction. Indeed, like most regimes, the Iranian one is keen on ensuring its survival. After witnessing the neighbouring Taliban and Iraqi governments toppled, Tehran may yield to the threat of force. Yet, how credible is this threat in the first place? Very low. And both the Americans and Iranians know this. Setting aside the difficulties of bombing all hidden and underground nuclear facilities, the political, military and economic costs of a war would be astronomic.

The only way in which sanctions may succeed, and this is far from guaranteed, is if they are used to build a common anti-proliferation coalition among all major powers, particularly the US, Russia and China. If great powers demonstrated a strong commitment to curbing nuclear proliferation worldwide by credibly reinvigorating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, only then real international pressure would be exerted on Tehran. While this seems to be the most viable option, it would need a stroke of diplomatic genius from the Obama administration to make it happen.

Gregorio Bettiza is LSE IDEAS Center Stonex Scholar and Transatlantic Programme Programme Assistant. Gregorio is a PhD candidate in the International Relations Department at LSE, where he is teaching and a research assistant.

Next Week: Israel and Palestine: Can peace talks resume?