Elite Politics Under the Spotlight: Whither Thailand (again)?

Less than a week ago on 13th January, we met to take stock of politics in Thailand ahead of the general election in an event co-sponsored by LSE IDEAS and the Pacific-Asia Specialist Group of the UK Political Studies Association. Controversy – of which Thailand has seen much in recent years – attracts and the event was well attended by a mixed academic and policy audience. Leading Thai specialists, Professor Duncan McCargo, who is Professor of Southeast Asian politics at the University of Leeds, and Professor Peter Leyland, Professor of Public Law at London Metropolitan University, spoke, offering a fascinating insight into possible elections scenarios and some of the likely challenges going forward in terms of unresolved political differences, the role of Constitutional Court, and upholding free speech.

While measured in their remarks, neither speaker was very optimistic. Asking the question as to whether the Democrats could win in the forthcoming general election, which is widely anticipated to take place in 2011, Professor McCargo reviewed the party’s performance at the ballot box going back to the mid 1980s. What he noted, is that one needs to go back to 1986 to find the last time they won a decisive election victory. And, as McCargo continued through the nineties and into the noughties, a clear pattern emerged. Yes, the Democrats can win power but rarely via an election and, moreover, they struggle to hold onto it. The key point, as McCargo delicately put it, is that time and time again “extra-electoral forces” intervene to seal their fate either way. The implications in terms of the future are clear but it is not a future to be envied with further street demonstrations between the so-called red and yellow shirts likely.  In addition, it is not even certain that the elections will be held in 2011. In May 2012, a five-year ban on certain pro-Thaksin (former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra) political parties from contesting elections will end.  Thus, according to McCargo, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that those who would benefit from a lifting of the ban might form some kind informal alliance to delay the election until this happens. Clearly, therefore, it is a case of watch this space!

Turning his attention to questions of law, Professor Leyland argued that the problem in Thailand is not the constitution itself but the inability of the country’s political elite to defer to bodies like the Constitutional Court.  Here, Professor Leyland drew attention to Buddhist approaches to conflict resolution – as opposed (presumably) to law-based ones – and issues to do with hierarchy and patron-client ties in Thai politics, which he argued interfered with the ability of elites to allow the courts to adjudicate.  That said, Leyland was very clear that law can never be a substitute for politics, suggesting that this was an “unobtainable ideal”.  Like McCargo, he did not see opportunities for a quick fix but he suggested that a number of things could be done, for example to protect the integrity of the Constitutional Court and stop it becoming comprised politically.  Specifically, Leyland argued that it would be better if individual politicians, who committed misdemeanours, were disqualified from politics rather than whole political parties, and he also suggested that such disputes be dealt with by the criminal courts not the Constitutional Court. Leyland spoke briefly on lese majeste, arguing that while it was entirely appropriate for the monarchy to be protected, it was problematic when lese majeste was used to undermine political opponents.

In conclusion, this was undoubtedly a rich and stimulating evening which took us beneath the surface of contemporary Thai politics. Once again, however, it highlights the paucity of liberal understandings of politics – with their tendency to emphasise a ‘triumph of civil society’ approach to political change – to make sense of Thailand’s past, present and future.

Dr Martin Gainsborough
Reader in Development Politics, University of Bristol
Co-convenor Pacific-Asia specialist group, UK Political Studies Association.

Islam and the State

Mention Islam and there is suspicion, fear and outrage in many non-Muslim countries particularly in the West, based on misrepresentation, not least by Muslims themselves. It is seen as some dark influence and threat incompatible with democracy and with the modern state system.

It was not surprising, therefore, that there was a large audience at the seminar on 9 November 2010 organised by the Southeast Asia Programme at LSE IDEAS on "Islam and the State: A Southeast Asian Perspective. " And it was apposite that the discussion should expand beyond the solid base of the paper "Islam and the State in Indonesia" presented by well-known authority on the subject Dr. Bahtiar Effendy.

Dr. Bahtiar traced the history of the relationship between political Islam and the state in Indonesia since its independence in 1945, and found that in the Indonesian modern state system the secular force always kept the upper hand even if the term "secularism" was not used so as not to antagonise Islamic sensitivities. There was a selective application of shariah laws, a partial accommodation with Islamic predisposition, applicable largely to personal but not criminal law. In the long 30 years of Suharto's rule up to 1998 particularly the influence of Islamic political forces was kept under strict check if not exactly for reason of secular instinct alone: Suharto would not accept any challenge to his primacy, not least from the fountain of Islamic appeal. Even when he was deposed in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis the so very many Islamic parties that sprouted did not find the kind of support that could challlenge the established order.

Professor Gilles Kepel, in his commentary, found some similarities in the Indonesian secular order with that in Turkey and Egypt. He held that an authoritarian order seamlessly categorised Islam as a dangerous threat and made it a scapegoat both for its rule and for its deficiencies. On the other hand, the opposition to this order found it efficacious to use the vocabulary of Islam against the stablished order whether or not truly driven by the call of the religion. Thus Islam gets a bad name in any case.

The containment of the challenge of Islam therefore was not strictly ideological as was not its assertion. So what has it all been about, all the rot we hear about Islam, and all the harm it has ostensibly caused? In countries where Muslims are in a majority, this force called Islamic whatever its basis and whatever it fought for has been kept in check, partly by authoritarian force and partly, as Dr. Bakhtiar contends, by economic satisfaction. Yet in countries where Muslims are in a minority assertion of Islamic right seems to be more strident and effective.

This speaks to a greater democracy in Islamic-minority countries but also to a more intense insistence by minority communities. There is greater abuse both of situation and of religion. In this instance the only weapon of argument can only be better understanding and wider exposure. Certainly a more difficult proposition than the hard fist of authoritarian rule. There is no alternative in the West, if democracy is its credo, to argument about Islam and how it is being misrepresented.

Islam is a tolerant (refer to the Al-Kafirun) and moderate (refer to the Al-Baqarrah) religion and the very often extremist expression is its deviant side, not the other way around. Form and hate are no substitute to substance and love. While there is a place for rituals under fardu 'Ain there is at least equal emphasis in the religion to fardu Kifayah (social obligations, duties and contribution to society). In talking about Islam and the state, while there is obviously need to relate the politics and the history, there cannot be avoided a discussion about Islam itself and how it is being practised.

Dr Munir Majid is Head of the Southeast Asia International Affairs Programme.