NATO goes into Marjah

NATO launched a major offensive today against the Taliban stronghold of Marjah in central Helmand. The strategy is interesting and unique for a few reasons. First, the attack was widely publicised in an attempt to get civilians out of the way to avoid casualties, but also in the hopes that the inhabitants of Marjah would side with the NATO forces and inform on the Taliban. Second, this is the first NATO assault where Afghan government forces - military, civilian, and police - will be following immediately in the wake the NATO operation. NATO forces will also remain in situ, but the Afghans are supposedly going to be starting with development and governance as soon as the dust follows. This is good in theory, but it remains to be seen how effective this has been. There as supposedly 1,000 Afghan police following on NATO's heels. If these are 1,000 honest and well trained police then Marjah will certainly be better off. If these are a bunch of poorly trained, corrupt and belligerent police - problems endemic in the Afghan police force - I am not sure their presence will do much good. Ultimately Marjah will be a test case for the wider NATO and Obama strategy in Afghanistan. The question is, why should the Taliban stay and fight in Marjah when they can melt away and move to other parts of the country not saturated with international forces? Hopefully the new strategy works, but I have my doubts given that international forces will never be present enough in all parts of the country to shut down the Taliban. Therefore, in addition to offensive operations the Government of Afghanistan needs to establish parameters outlining how to involve some Taliban in the government, while the international community needs to be much more effective at training and equipping Afghan police and military forces.

Israel and Palestine: Can peace talks resume?

Welcome to the Middle East International Affairs (MEIA) blog at LSE IDEAS. We invite PhD students and academics from throughout the UK and abroad to analyse current events in the Middle East and add to the ongoing deliberations over policy prescriptions. Our next contributor, Anne de Jong, examines an option for moving out of a stalemate in Middle East peace negotiations.

We look forward to exploring both regional and topical issues relating to current events.
Amber Holewinski, Editor, LSE IDEAS Middle East International Affairs Programme Blog

Peace or Justice

By Anne de Jong

It all started so promisingly—the famous Cairo speech on the 4th of July by President Obama, the appointment of Northern Ireland peace broker George J. Mitchell as his special envoy to the Middle East and an unprecedented commitment from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Yet barely one year in, preconditions kept the negotiation table untouched, the situation in Gaza in a state of ‘permanent humanitarian crisis’ and prominent commentators already declared this new initiative dead. With even the ever optimistic Mitchell acknowledging ‘unforeseen complexities and difficulties,’ one should ask: Are peace talks possible in Israel/Palestine?

Negotiating Negotiations

One would assume that negotiations start at the negotiating table, but the first obstacle to resuming peace talks is preconditions made by both the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli State. The Palestinian Authority demands a full settlement freeze because, as Palestinian lawyer Michael Tarasi put it, ‘we are negotiating about dividing a pizza and in the meantime, Israel is eating it.’

A settlement freeze was fully supported by the U.S. administration with a strong statement by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: “The president wants to see a stop to settlements-not some settlements, not outposts, not ‘natural growth’ exceptions. That is our position.”

When Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu rejected this position, however, no sanctions or pressures were put in place. Rather than placing conditions on loan guarantees or limiting military aid, Clinton applauded Netanyahu’s offer of ten months settlement restraint and labeled it ‘an important step forward.’

This settlement restraint does not concern expansion in occupied East Jerusalem where the construction of almost 700 new apartments has just been approved. Nor does it cover infrastructure development to and from settlements in the West Bank. Welcoming Netanyahu’s settlement restraint, and thus renouncing their own demand for a full settlement stop, not only labels the U.S administration as inconsistent, but more seriously it endangers the credibility of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.

He has already finished his term in office without elections and made little progress toward overcoming the internal rivalry between Fatah and Hamas. He cannot come to the negotiation table without losing the already fragile support of the Palestinian people as long as settlement construction is ongoing.

In addition, Israel put forward a precondition for negotiations which it knows that no Palestinian leader can accept: the recognition of Israel as the ‘nation-state of the Jewish people.’ The PLO already recognized the right of Israel to exist as a state in 1993 in a series of official and public letters leading up to the Oslo Accords. The difference this time lies in the acceptance of the national character of Israel as Jewish. This would predetermine negotiations on the “right of return” of Palestinian refugees and further relegate the status of Palestinian-Israelis to non-nationals.

Knowing quite well that the Palestinian Authority cannot afford to disregard 1.5 million Palestinians living in Israel and approximately 5 million refugees and their descendants living in the diaspora, it appears that Netanyahu is stalling if not sabotaging any final status negotiations. And where the Obama administration proved to be flexible on the precondition of a settlement freeze, they blindly accept this far-reaching Israeli demand.

What kind of Peace?

It is possible, though unlikely, that the U.S. might use their economic muscle to force both parties to the table. Once there, however, the ‘endgame’ looms large. With an apparent worldwide consensus for a two-state solution, it will be Mitchell’s job to transform this consensus into a pragmatic peace process.

The Palestinian demands are clear: a sovereign Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza with East Jerusalem as its capital. A full withdrawal from the Occupied Territories would not only halt Palestinian hostilities towards Israel, but would also guarantee full normalized relations with the 22 surrounding Arab countries, in line with the 2002 Arab Initiative.

Israel’s demands are less straightforward. While Netanyahu expressed the wish for an independent Palestinian state to be created alongside Israel, his Four No’s would prevent any pragmatic steps towards that end.

According to Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat, Netanyahu’s Four No’s—No to a settlement freeze, No to dividing Jerusalem, No to 1967 borders and No to refugees—would render impossible ‘a viable, independent, and sovereign Palestinian state.’ Netanyahu’s vision of a demilitarized Palestinian state without control over its own borders, riddled with Israeli settlements and with a continued Israeli military presence in the Jordan Valley would create a ‘Palestinian state’ without sovereignty or independence at all.

Peace or Justice

That brings us to the disturbing contemporary reality: a stalemate in negotiations with an eerie resemblance to the 2000 Camp David breakdown. Without Jerusalem, without sovereign borders, and without at least compensation for the refugees, Palestinians are left with Netanyahu’s vision of an ‘economic peace’ under complete Israeli military control.

Gaza would remain isolated and the West Bank divided into pockets of Palestinian reserves. East Jerusalem, whose annexation by Israel is unrecognized by the international community, would see a continuation of house demolitions and evictions. The status of 1.5 million non-Jewish Israelis as second class citizens would not be addressed, and continued institutional and social discrimination against them would be justified under the banner of the Jewish State.

Are peace talks possible? Sure. But without Jerusalem or viable final borders on the table—without talks that are rooted in international law—they will be empty at best. At worse, they will be a fig leaf for ongoing settlement expansion in the West Bank, ethnic cleansing in East Jerusalem, collective punishment in Gaza and continuing military oppression based on ethnic segregation.

Perhaps a more apt question would be: Would peace talks under current conditions be part of a genuine peace process or merely a continuation of the rapidly-deteriorating status quo?

Anne de Jong is a Dutch PhD student at the School of Oriental and African Studies at the department of Anthropology with a specialization in the Middle East. By combining academia and journalism she aims to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the contemporary Middle East with a special interest in the Israel/Palestine conflict.

Next Week: Turkey: Reengagement with the Middle East?

Iran: What is the effect of more sanctions on domestic Iranian politics?

Welcome to the Middle East International Affairs (MEIA) blog at LSE IDEAS. We invite PhD students and academics from throughout the UK and abroad to analyse current events in the Middle East and add to the ongoing deliberations over policy prescriptions. Our next contributors, Adel Al Toraifi and Gregorio Bettiza, examine the implications of new sanctions on Iran as the US, Britain, France and Germany consider a fourth round of UN sanctions.

We look forward to exploring both regional and topical issues relating to current events.
Amber Holewinski, Editor, LSE IDEAS Middle East International Affairs Programme Blog


Don’t sanction the people!
Why current proposals for sanctions against Iran can do more harm than good.

By Adel Al Toraifi

A diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear programme is certainly the most desirable outcome. However, it seems that the chances for such a resolution are diminishing by time, to the extent that rumours of a possible US or Israeli air-strike on Iranian nuclear facilities has become a weekly routine in the current media for the past year. The debate over the issue has spanned now more than six years, three of them in which Iran has continued publicly to defy the UNSC Resolution 1696 ban on its uranium enrichment programme. A fourth round of sanctions proposed by members of the six nations has not even been agreed upon despite a year of negotiations. China and Russia have been stalling the approval of further sanctions due to their economic interests with Iran; nevertheless both states have demonstrated some pressure on Iran to comply with UNSC resolutions. Lately, the improvement of Russian-US relations has proven to be productive, as Russia refused to set a delivery date regarding its arms deal to sell the sophisticated S-300 anti-aircraft system to Iran.

Perhaps the biggest obstacle in the face of new sanctions is China. The Chinese government has continuously opposed any new sanction on Iran and its position could determine the fate of the proposed sanctions. China has pledged to retaliate for U.S. arms sales to Taiwan and warns Sino-U.S. ties will suffer further when President Barack Obama and the Dalai Lama meet - as expected - later this month. Nevertheless, U.S. officials and China experts believe Beijing - despite heated anti-U.S. rhetoric of recent days - will not stand in the way.

Now, the crucial question is not whether the six nations would manage to sanction Iran or not, but how important this step would be?

The current proposal, discussed in New York last month, would most likely target Iranian shipping companies that have violated the UN arms embargo. They would also likely bar nations and international lenders, such as the World Bank, from giving Iran any grants, loans or other financial aid, except for humanitarian or development purposes. Moreover, the sanctions would also target Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). According to the Council on Foreign Relations' report titled Iran's Revolutionary Guards (June 2009), the IRGC has evolved into one of the country's most influential domestic institutions. It controls strategic industries, commercial services and black-market enterprises.

Proponents of the current sanctions proposal say that they simply need to be stronger, but a tougher sanctions regime has a number of problems. First, it will take yet more time to adopt any new measures and, with each passing day, Iran’s program advances. Many experts already believe Iran can now build a bomb and the point of no return has passed. Second, sanctions have already been in place for decades and have not stopped Iran’s progress. The current sanctions have proven ineffective because a number of countries have undermined them, with recent talks between Iranian and Brazilian officials on a Biofuel project as a clear example.

Perhaps the most significant problem with the idea of sanctions is that, as Mitchell Bard recently noted, “it gives the impression of action without really achieving anything.” This is true, despite UN, US and EU sanctions over the years, the Iranian regime has not changed course. New sanctions would mostly target the ordinary population more than it will harm the Ayatollahs. These measures tend to undermine the fact that half of the Iranian economy and civil services are owned or run directly by the same people and institutions it wants to punish. The fallout of the 2009 elections has proven to be an important force for positive change the country, and the policy of “wait and see” by the West, though passive, has denied the conservatives in Iran from using one of the most effective tools in the hand of the regime, blaming the West.

Any meddling in the current situation could easily swing the pendulum to the other side. The international community should demonstrate its will for halting proliferation of nuclear programmes; nevertheless, imposing more sanctions at this stage might aid those whom were responsible of violating the NPT treaty in the first place.

Adel Zaid Al Toraifi is a political analyst and researcher, based in London. His area of specialty is International Relations, concentrating on Middle Eastern affairs: Saudi foreign policy and Iranian politics.

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Sanctioning Iran, what for?

By Gregorio Bettiza

The question often asked about America implementing further sanctions on Iran, is whether these sanctions will work. But this is the wrong question. The issue is not whether sanctions themselves will succeed or not in curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, in fact they will not. The real issue is, what will the Obama administration decide to use sanctions for.

If sanctions are simply intended to pressure Iran into abandoning its nuclear program, these will be futile. Iran has proven resistant to multiple previous rounds. Indeed, financial and trade restrictions so far have not stopped Iran from enriching uranium or building secret nuclear facilities. If instead sanctions are intended to weaken the Iranian regime and strengthen the opposition, in the hope for a more favourable deal, this is wishful thinking. In fact, sanctions are likely to empower the regime, not undermine it. In most other cases (i.e. Cuba, Iraq, North Korea, Myanmar, Sudan) they have done exactly that, entrenching governing elites while these pass on the costs to the population.

Since sanctions alone will not work, Obama could consider using them as a symbolic gesture of last resort before military action would be seriously taken into consideration. Accompanied by the threat of intervention, sanctions may gain some traction. Indeed, like most regimes, the Iranian one is keen on ensuring its survival. After witnessing the neighbouring Taliban and Iraqi governments toppled, Tehran may yield to the threat of force. Yet, how credible is this threat in the first place? Very low. And both the Americans and Iranians know this. Setting aside the difficulties of bombing all hidden and underground nuclear facilities, the political, military and economic costs of a war would be astronomic.

The only way in which sanctions may succeed, and this is far from guaranteed, is if they are used to build a common anti-proliferation coalition among all major powers, particularly the US, Russia and China. If great powers demonstrated a strong commitment to curbing nuclear proliferation worldwide by credibly reinvigorating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, only then real international pressure would be exerted on Tehran. While this seems to be the most viable option, it would need a stroke of diplomatic genius from the Obama administration to make it happen.

Gregorio Bettiza is LSE IDEAS Center Stonex Scholar and Transatlantic Programme Programme Assistant. Gregorio is a PhD candidate in the International Relations Department at LSE, where he is teaching and a research assistant.

Next Week: Israel and Palestine: Can peace talks resume?