Snapshots of Obama’s First 100 Days: A French Spring in Washington?

When Barack Obama fielded questions from an adoring French audience in Strasbourg earlier this month, he pleased his hosts by singling out a shining example of European ingenuity in public transportation – the high-speed rail system. The president disclosed his envy for high-speed trains to the audience, and it should not be taken lightly when American presidents get envious. Just two weeks later in Washington Obama actively campaigned for a similar network in the United States and committed $8 billion for good measure.

Riders of the TGV rejoiced at high velocity, no doubt. Six years ago, seldom were heard any encouraging words for all things French. Claims of France’s relegation to the “old Europe” highlighted the opinion that America could replace Paris with Prague and Berlin with Budapest. The election of the progressive Obama has seen off that argument. In a strange twist of fate that would make Donald Rumsfeld smolder, we see a lot more of France in American public policies these days.

Looking at the ambitious agenda laid out in these lively first 100 days, the social democratic tendencies are remarkable. In response to the ongoing financial crisis, the Obama administration is considering deals to secure a large ownership stake in 19 of America’s largest banks. Speculation rose this week that it would seize a majority stake in the nation’s largest automobile manufacturer, General Motors. The stimulus bill passed in February includes $27 billion devoted to transportation infrastructure, in addition to the money set aside for high-speed rail. And then there’s health care component: $634 billion in the administration’s proposed budget to serve as a “down payment” for overhauling the fragmented and ineffective private system into a public-private entity, aimed at driving down costs and providing universal coverage.

You would think a merry band of French social democrats decamped from the rive gauche to infiltrate the Washington area (although surely not on the Potomac’s own left bank, Virginia). To make sure the parallels did not get out of hand, the Brookings Institution convened a panel asking the now mind-blowing question: “Is America the New France?” Senior Fellow and moderator Justin Vaisse quickly pointed out that if the United Sates was indeed turning into France, the journey to New York would take a mere 90 minutes, all citizens would enjoy health coverage, eighty per cent of homes would be powered by nuclear energy, and the food of far higher quality. Clive Crook, the chief Washington columnist with the Financial Times, opined that while the differences are narrowing, Americans and the French still retain vastly different views of the individual’s relationship to the state and of what one should expect of his government. Brookings Senior Fellow William Galston underscored this point with compelling data from a recent OECD survey: French public spending is 15 per cent higher than in the United States. This translates into France boasting half the poverty rate of America and 25 per cent less inequality between the rich and the poor. France also offers twice the amount of benefits to its unemployed, which recently rose to 8.2 per cent.

Overall, the panel concluded, embracing French public policies can yield only limited benefits for Americans. The overriding concern is that the American government, in the absence of a viable and coherent opposition, will exert too much control over its citizens - a decidedly transformative prospect, and not one for the better. All agreed that over-indulging in the American social democratic experiment would be detrimental to the American self-image as independent, self-determined, and hard-working. As for the upgrade in gastronomy, the American appetite will surely abide without any qualms whatsoever.

Obama, Clinton and the Future of US Foreign Policy

Today, one of the most polarizing figures in American politics went before the Senate for confirmation hearings on her suitability to serve as the next US Secretary of State. When Hillary Clinton was nominated back in November many on both sides of the political spectrum were outraged. But perhaps none were more disturbed by her selection than the die-hard, anti-war liberals that helped propel Obama to victory on November 4. While many might see this as a sign of politics as usual, the fact of the matter is Obama made a brilliant decision in choosing Clinton and she will be an excellent Secretary of State – if she is allowed to do her job.

The relationship between the Secretary of State and the President is second to none when it comes to the effective and smooth operation of American foreign policy. A good Secretary of State is one that is said to possess the total trust and confidence of the President. An ineffective Secretary of State is one overshadowed and micromanaged by the President. Rusk was ineffective because Kennedy, a foreign policy neophyte, choose weak man he could control. Kennedy wanted to run foreign policy by himself. Kissinger was effective because Nixon but all his faith in him. Baker did wonders for George H. W. Bush, Powell failed spectacularly because Cheney cut him off at the knees.

Appointing Hillary Clinton Secretary of State sent a message to the world about the importance of shifting American foreign policy in a more liberal internationalist direction. Obama went for political experience. While in the Senate, Clinton stunned experts from fields as diverse as nursing and education, to national security on her grasp of the small details of her diverse policy portfolios. She will bring that same dedication to her job at State. Furthermore, Hillary Clinton brings a level of star power to the post that will strengthen her ability to shed light on important issues by keeping them on the front burner.

But her appointment, and most likely confirmation, are not without risk. Senator Clinton and President -Elect Obama have been rivals. Senator Clinton is seen as pragmatic and reportedly does not carry personal grudges. It is rumored the same is not true for many of her personal staff. When it comes to filling out State Department posts in the next few weeks, the truth will be readily evident. But one should have no qualms about Mrs Clinton getting down to business as part of the team letting sleeping dogs lie.

After all, this is a woman who when elected to the Senate from New York went and worked with people like Lindsay Graham who just a few years earlier had tried to impeach her husband. In no time at all Clinton had Republicans singing her praises as a bipartisan politician. Even Rupert Murdoch reportedly apologized to her during he Senate tenure for the negative press she got in the New York Post while First Lady. If Hillary Clinton is anything at all, she is a can-do operator. But she can only be a doer if the other side plays ball.

Obama is the most popular American politician in living memory, with the star power of Jack Kennedy and the perceived wisdom of Franklin Roosevelt. If such a President backs his Secretary of State wholeheartedly then it would appear that the starts are in alignment. But at the same time, the President is the most visible figure in America. And globally Obama is even more popular. He of course will be giving the orders, but will he let Clinton carry them out in a manner befitting her talents? Even more important, where does Joe Biden, a man widely considered the dean of foreign policy in the Senate fit in to the future running of American foreign policy?

One good option is for Mrs Clinton to do the day-to-day diplomacy, while Mr Biden engages in a radical overhaul of the US national security establishment. Right now, American foreign policy is dead in the water not just because of failed Bush policies. The US Agency for International Development has been gutted, the State Department has been neglected, and the Department of Defense looms large over all aspects of American foreign policy, presenting an overly militarized Uncle Sam to the world. The various organizations do not work well together. Quite frankly, the relationship in conflict zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan has been downright hostile. No wonder US foreign policy is dysfunctional.

With a number of hot button issues such as Iran, Israel-Palestine, the war in Afghanistan, insecurity in Pakistan and a recalcitrant Russia, Mrs Clinton will not have time to run policy while over-seeing a massive overhaul of the State Department, never mind the wider national security architecture. State after all is only one part of a much larger puzzle. Mr Biden, with an excellent knowledge of the type of world American must lead and a comprehensive understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the US national security establishment would be well suited to carry out such a review and start change in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense, State and other related cabinet posts. Using such an approach will ensure that policy problems will be well managed, structural issues can be addressed and Mr Obama will have time to worry about a number of other pressing domestic issues.

There is no reason to doubt that Mr Obama and Mr Biden will not back Hillary Clinton 110 percent. But if history is any guide, the going may be more difficult that many expect. Vanity and ego are not strangers to politics. Hopefully, the wisdom that Mr Obama has displayed in is selection of cabinet appointments will carry on into the execution of policy.

Obama and Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War.

If President-elect Obama makes good on his campaign promise to withdraw troops from Iraq, it would be a serious mistake to ship them to Afghanistan. The situation there requires a more comprehensive approach that emphasizes politics and diplomacy. Mr. Obama could do worse than to draw some lessons from the Soviet effort to find a political solution in the late 1980s.

In its own entanglement, Moscow was supporting a quasi-communist government and fighting a counterinsurgency financed and supplied by the U.S., Saudi Arabia, and a number of others, primarily through Pakistan. Soviet diplomats, military officers, and security officials worked tirelessly to find an international agreement as well as to win over mujahadeen leaders and convince them to join a coalition government.

The Soviets faced formidable challenges: the party they were supporting was internally divided, the opposition was well supplied for a variety of sources, and the U.S. drove a hard bargain by refusing to stop sending weapons until the Kabul government stepped down. While Moscow wanted to end the war that was a drain on resources, men, and morale, it had to so without leaving a vacuum or a hostile government on its southern border.

When the USSR invaded Afghanistan it did not expect to create a communist state there. Rather, the goal was to create a stable and friendly government in Kabul. The thousands of party advisors sent to assist in spreading government authority, however, often ignored local traditions; by 1986 Moscow realized they were doing more harm than good. Moscow ultimately concluded that even the generous amount of technical and political assistance it was providing would not end the civil war there if major opposition leaders could not be brought into the government.

The U.S. invaded Afghanistan to strike at the heart of Al-Qaeda; once there, it engaged in a massive democratization program. The results of its efforts have been mixed, but it is clear that the country is becoming less stable, and the distinctly anti-democratic Taliban are gaining the upper hand. Given the circumstances, it is time to recognize that the U.S. should devote its energies primarily to creating a potentially undemocratic but nevertheless stable Afghanistan, something Mr. Obama is reportedly considering.

Even this more limited goal will prove difficult to achieve. However, the Soviet experience suggests the following steps will be necessary. First, finding a strong leader who can unite enough of Afghanistan’s various forces to keep the country from spinning out of control. The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in part to remove the erratic and bloody-minded Hafizullah Amin, then spent six years trying to prop up the ineffectual Babrak Karmal before overseeing his replacement with Mohammed Najibullah. For all his faults (and he had many) the new leader proved strong enough to hold his own party together while using his clan links to open dialogue with some opposition leaders.

Second, it will mean taking an active role in bringing former enemies into the fold. Moscow got into this game a little too late, and its efforts were hampered by internal divisions about which mujahadeen leaders would be acceptable partners for the the Kabul government. In this sense the U.S. is somewhat better positioned – it already has similar experience in Iraq, where General David Petraeus was able to reach out to Sunni leaders in the Anbar province.

Third, it will mean forging a regional consensus on Afghanistan which includes Iran, Pakistan, Russia and the Central Asian States. In general the U.S. has been able to cooperate with each of these countries to a greater or lesser degree from the start of the NATO operation there in 2001. However, the Bush administration’s failure to constructively engage Iran and Russia, as well as its miscalculations in Pakistan, have created a murky picture in the region. (Needless to say, improving relations with Iran is doubly important if Obama is serious about withdrawing from Iraq.)

The Harvard realist Stephen Walt argues that going through with a planned expansion of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan may not be the best idea because of the relative costs involved. I would add that it is unlikely the U.S. or its NATO allies will commit the numbers necessary to pacify all the regions where the Taliban is active. If NATO were to take a more active role on the Pakistani side of the Pushtun tribal belt, which serves as a refuge for Taliban fighters, it would likely do more harm than good. It is useful to remember that Moscow also experimented with increasing troop numbers even as it was looking for a way out of the conflict in 1985, but ultimately Soviet leaders saw that the “surge” was only deepening their involvement, not leading to a resolution. It is safe to say that Afghanistan will only become stable once enough Taliban are co-opted to make a central government viable and the Afghan military (and tribal militias) are able to fight the remainder with U.S. supplies.

Soviet leaders were aiming for a similar scenario as they sought a way to withdraw their troops between 1986 and 1991. Almost all of the former participants (both people on the ground and at the center of decision-making in Moscow) I have spoken with believe they came close to succeeding. When the Geneva Accords were signed in April 1988, it was far from clear whether the Soviet backed government in Kabul would last more than a few months after the withdrawal. Yet after February 1989 the Afghan army, which rarely took a leading role in battles while Soviet troops were there, proved able to face down mujahadeen offensives on its own. Not only did the Kabul government hold most of the territory previously held primarily by Soviet forces, but the regime actually outlasted the USSR by four months!

Many Soviet officers realized early in the war that the task of creating a stable Afghanistan could never be fulfilled through military means. Eventually their superiors in Moscow came to believe the same thing and began pursuing both international diplomacy and internal reconciliation. When I spoke to Nikolai Kozyrev, the chief Soviet negotiator at the Geneva Accords and a specialist on the region, he highlighted this as the main lesson to draw from the Soviet experience. “Diplomacy allowed us to withdraw our troops,” he said, and pointed out that talks with the Taliban were absolutely necessary. In the end, the reconciliation would be up to by the Afghans themselves.

Further Reading:
For the current situation in Afghanistan and how it developed, I highly recommend the work of Dr. Antonio Giustozzi at the Crisis States Research Centre, including this paper. The veteran journalist Ahmed Rashid recently released a useful book on the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan, pessimistically entitled Descent into Chaos. A number of useful reports are available from the International Crisis Group. Finally, there was an interesting discussion on Iraq and Afghanistan this weekend in the New York Times.