The Expulsion of Washington's ambassador to Bolivia

Early this morning, my wife assured me that the Bolivian government was tossing out my ambassador, not me or any other Americans. I woke up to see the Minister of the Presidency, Juan Ramos Quintana, explaining tensely that the government has nothing against Americans in general, just US Ambassador Phillip Goldberg, who has spent the last few weeks meeting with leaders of separatist groups in Santa Cruz and Tarija, who are seeking the overthrow of the first Bolivian government headed by an indigenous president, Evo Morales Ayma. The expulsion of Goldberg, whose previous experience includes long stretches war-torn Yugoslavia and Kosovo, marks the culmination of his months-long battle with the Bolivian president, one based on a history of mistrust that is deeply reminiscent of the Cold War.

Last June, for example, a 20-year old Miami woman was arrested at La Paz's El Alto International Airport trying to enter the country with 500 rounds of .45 caliber ammunition while the wife of Washington's military attaché waited to greet her at the airport. The story barely made headlines in the US, mostly because Ambassador Goldberg resisted Morales’s demand for a full investigation, characterizing the event as an "innocent error.”

Then, three months ago, thousands of protesters descended upon the US embassy in La Paz, threatening to burn it to the ground. They were demanding that Washington accede to President Morales's extradition request for former President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada and former Defense Minister Carlos Sanchez Berzain. Both leaders are wanted in Bolivia on charges of genocide and human rights violations for their role in Black October, a series of protests in October 2003 in which dozens of indigenous Bolivians were gunned down by troops, allegedly upon government orders. Sanchez de Lozada currently resides in Chevy Chase, Maryland, while Sanchez Berzain works in Miami for a former US Ambassador to Bolivia, Manual Rochas, a firebrand who in 2002 warned that Washington would cut off aid if Bolivians elected Morales or his allies.

While these developments have served to strain the US-Bolivian relationship, it was Ambassador Goldberg's perceived role in stoking ethnic conflict, regional separatism, and violent insurgency that finally sparked last night's shock announcement. For the past several months, powerful interests, mainly in the country's east, have brought the country to the precipice of civil war. The capital of the insurgency is Santa Cruz, where political and economic power remains in the hands of a white and mestizo feudal elite, historically loyal to the United States and the anti-communist dictators that occupied the Palacio Quemado for much of the Cold War.

Over the past two weeks, violence against Indians, government buildings, and national gas installations has increased significantly, much of it led by the neo-fascist Unión Juvenil Cruceñista, the youth counterpart to the Pro-Santa Cruz Civic Committee, a business-led activist group founded decades ago as an anti-communist counterweight to Bolivia’s 1950s revolutionary governments. In neighboring Tarija, the newly-formed Unión Juvenil Tarijenista is occupying the airport to prevent the government from flying in reinforcements. Meanwhile, another group of anti-government youths attacked a major gas pipeline, which is now costing La Paz an estimated $8 million a day in export revenues.

President Morales’s apparent hesitancy to meet the insurgency with serious force reflects two historic fears. First of all, his movement suffered greatly at the hands of the country’s military in the Gas War of 2003. Secondly, Morales’s supporters harbor a historic mistrust in their country’s military leaders, who in the early 1960s took power for themselves when they were called upon by the country’s revolutionary leaders to put down a rightwing rebellion from the east. Despite having vowed to remain loyal to the 1952 revolution, Bolivia’s generals reversed many of the redistributive policies set by the revolutionary regime and did not relinquish power until the 1980s. Since Morales and his supporters see themselves as the heirs to the revolution, they are reluctant to make the same mistake by turning its reins over to the country’s generals.

Not waiting for government action against the rioters, many of Morales's fervent indigenous supporters have vowed to march on Santa Cruz and Tarija, confronting the mostly mestizo youths. Meanwhile, indigenous campesinos have attacked opposition headquarters and the offices of UNITEL, the country's main television station which has fervently taken up the opposition's banner. Again, anti-US sentiment is stoked by Washington’s history of bankrolling opposition media outlets in Latin America, whether or not a US-UNITEL connection exists.

I was passing by UNITEL's offices last night when I found out that my ambassador had been expelled. Military police in riot gear were guarding the opposition television station, despite the fact that the government’s supporters had been behind the attempted arson. The taxi driver explained that a group of campesinos loyal to the government had just tried to burn down UNITEL, expressed lament that their attempt had failed, and proudly stated that his president had just declared the US ambassador to be persona non grata.

Obama Abroad and In the Minds of American Voters

The word is out: US presidential candidate Barack Obama scored a resounding victory with his recent eight-nation swing through the Middle East and Europe. With every stop, a remarkable media buzz and scores of well-timed, dignified images poured into the global political consciousness. It even seemed that for a short time, the world could regale in a US presidential campaign appearing to court a riveted (albeit non-voting) foreign public. In Afghanistan and the Middle East embattled leaders embraced Obama, understanding he may one day hold their respective fates in his hands. Obama struck the rights chords by promising more help in Afghanistan, more sovereignty to Iraq, and undiminished support for Israel. In Europe, Obamamania soared as he skipped across the continent, one day a public blitz in Berlin, another in Paris for a coup of statecraft, and concluding in London with grand day out.

For those who weren’t aboard “O-Force One” drenched in the festivities the commentaries remained notably sanguine, even by conservative estimates. The Christian Science Monitor conceded “there is little doubt that in taking the eight-nation tour, Obama has altered the calculus of the presidential race.” The Economist acknowledged Obama’s tour went off “better than he could have dared hope.” But with so many correspondents and news anchors on this junket, few were left behind to report on John McCain’s muted claims of media bias, or expand on the quite legitimate complaint that Obama's overseas adventures meant eschewing, for a time, his responsibilities to voters back home.

Undoubtedly, if Europeans could weigh in on this election the outcome would be long since decided by now. A recent YouGov/Daily Telegraph poll showed respondents in Britain, Italy, France, Germany and Russia preferring Obama by an average margin of nearly 5 to 1. Predictably, these figures carry no truck with Americans. In fact, under certain circumstances such an outpouring of affection from foreign constituencies (and Europeans in particular) only serve to raise suspicions that inevitably produce the opposite effect. During the 2004 US election, George W. Bush exploited the rumor that his opponent, John Kerry, was preferred by European leaders. He chided Kerry for indulging European opinions, in effect raising nagging questions about his opponent's allegiances, and summarily reaffirmed in many voters' minds the correctness of his administration's security policy.

As Obama savors his glorious receptions abroad, a lingering question returns: do Americans pay any mind to international views of their election? One piece of evidence at this time suggests they might be coming around: the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press reported in June that 56 per cent of Americans see its lowered respect from abroad as a major problem, up from 48 per cent in 2006. It has not gone unnoticed, either, that recent policy shifts opening the way to engagement with Iran and withdrawal from Iraq echo Obama's calls to reconcile with America's international partners. Bear in mind, of course, that it is foolhardy to believe Americans will openly seek suggestions from outsiders on how they should vote in November, especially as domestic issues command greater attention.

Still, one cannot help but wonder how this increased concern will play out in the coming election and beyond. As far as this question of whether Americans care is concerned, it is hard for them to discount the high confidence among foreign audiences in Obama to do the right thing in matters dealing with foreign affairs. How much does this confidence matter? If history provides any clues, some may exist in the correlation between a president's popularity at home as opposed to abroad. Although pollsters have only recently begun to chart foreign popularity of the US president, it is safe to say those who completed their terms in office with approval ratings over 60 per cent (Clinton, Reagan, Kennedy, and Eisenhower) enjoyed some measure of popularity abroad. It seems highly unlikely given the options that any president in the era of approval ratings could achieve overseas popularity while suffering from low approval ratings at home.

Americans justifiably question the foreign policy for the inexperienced first-term senator, but with his intentions for rapprochement with Europe made clear this past week excited Europeans are banking on hopes that Americans will see their fortunes as unified with those of the rest of the world, and realize that choosing the US president affects populations beyond its borders. Foreign enthusiasm over Obama is fueled by speculation that America may at last be tiring of the often contentious stewardship of George W. Bush and furthermore desire a more genial global leadership style to offset the more sobering aspects of its enormous power. It remains to be seen whether such enthusiasm and anticipation will be enough to tilt the balance in Obama's favor.

A Long Goodbye

What Gorbachev’s effort to get out of Afghanistan can tell us about how a President Obama might face the challenge of withdrawing from Iraq.

Barack Obama’s progressive supporters have been upset by his recent statements on Iraq. Yet his recent “move to the center” on the war should not be particularly surprising. After all, no matter how opposed he may have been to the war in 2003, in 2008 he would be taking over as commander in chief of the world’s most powerful nation and military with commitments all over the world. His advisors have pointed out, no doubt, that how he handles the situation will determine how he is seen by his detractors at home and how the US is seen abroad for years to come.

A useful historical parallel is the Soviet experience in trying to get out of Afghanistan. Mikhail Gorbachev, a reform minded leader who came to power in March 1985, faced a similar dilemma to the one Obama will face if elected. He was opposed to the war but was afraid of the consequences a withdrawal of Soviet troops might have on Moscow’s relationships with its numerous allies and clients. On the day he became General Secretary he jotted down a note saying that the Soviet Union needed to find a way out of Afghanistan, but do it in stages.

A US withdrawal from Iraq would most likely lead to an increase in violence, at least in the short term. It could mean increased influence for Iran. It could mean that US allies in the region and beyond, no matter their views on the war, begin to doubt Washington’s commitment and look elsewhere for support. All of the above could become ammunition for conservatives at home, much like the collapse of South Vietnam became a rallying point for conservatives in the late 1970s.

All of this could happen even if the US stays in Iraq for 10 years. The long term consequences for the US, as well as the region, might be more severe. But politics is a short term business. President Obama would have to think about the 2012 election, when the consequences of a withdrawal could be used against him.

That is why I was not surprised to hear that Obama was “modifying” his stance on troop withdrawal. After an uproar from his progressive supporters, he explained himself at a speech in Georgia on July 8: “We have to be as careful getting out as we were careless getting in…You’ve got to be sure our troops are safe, you have to be sure the country doesn’t collapse.”

Gorbachev made similar statements on numerous occasions between 1985 and 1989, when the withdrawal, in closed, official meetings. Here he is at Politburo meeting in February 1987:

We could leave [Afghanistan] quickly…and blame everything on the previous leadership, which planned everything. But we can’t do that. They’re worried in India, they’re worried in Africa. They think that this will be a blow to the authority of the Soviet Union in the national-liberation movement. Imperialism, they say, if it wins in Afghanistan, will go on the offensive.

Indeed, Moscow’s numerous allies were worried about the implications of a withdrawal and the collapse of a fellow communist state and made their concerns known to Soviet officials. Gorbachev felt Moscow could not take these concerns lightly.

Gorbachev spent several years trying to find ways to make possible a Soviet withdrawal that did not bring about the collapse of the communist regime in Kabul and the attendant blow to Soviet prestige. This included economic aid as well as a policy of national reconciliation to bring opposition elements into the Kabul government. Most of these, however, resembled efforts undertaken between 1980 and 1985. Only when it had become clear that these efforts were failing that Moscow really started to move towards a withdrawal, which finally began in May 1988. In the meantime, the Soviet 40^th army continued to lose over 1000 dead per year and many more wounded.

Contrary to the expectations of US intelligence officials and many in Moscow, the Kabul regime survived without Soviet troops as long as Moscow kept sending economic aid and materiel. Soviet prestige did not collapse as a result of the withdrawal – on the contrary, it allowed Moscow to improve relations not only with the United States but also with China and some nations in the Middle East.

Which brings us back to Obama. A delay in the withdrawal may be justified, but only if he has a serious plan of what will happen during that period. His desire to talk to Iran is a good start- that country is a regional power and will no doubt carry weight in Iraq long after foreign troops are gone. Yet if he has a concrete plan to make sure the Iraqi army is more reliable than it is now or that the government is more stable he has not shown it.

My fear is that President Obama may, like Gorbachev, spend precious time reinventing the wheel or waiting for already failing programs to work. The delay may placate some of his conservative critics, but it will also be costly in terms of live lost and treasure spent. And it may erode his political capital as well, making his task of improving Washington’s relationship with the rest of the world much more difficult.

Of course, the United States is not the Soviet Union, Obama is not Gorbachev, Iraq is not Afghansitan. Yet the concerns that leaders of powerful empires face in trying to extricate their armies from such wars are similar. Obama’s supporters who would like to see him bring the troops home will most likely be disappointed, just as those who hoped Gorbachev would bring the troops home right after coming to power were to see the war drag on for almost four more years.