Welcome to the LSE IDEAS Blog

LSE IDEAS is a centre for the study of international affairs, diplomacy and grand strategy at the London School of Economics. This blog features articles, resources, reviews and opinion pieces from academics associated with LSE IDEAS.

Monday, 13 July 2009

Update on Honduras from Central America:

In recent days several things have become clearer about the recent coup in Honduras, and its effects are being felt around the region.

 

Firstly, there is a significant difference between the story being sold around the world by the mainstream media, and that which is being relayed in Central America via local radio stations in Honduras, and local journalists who are still managing to report on the situation in the country. On the day when another 3 people have been reportedly murdered by the illegal regime, this information gap is more than interesting.

 

A quick look at the ‘western’ media indicates that Zelaya was indeed overthrown, but he provoked this coup by carrying out policies he wasn’t elected for, pushing for re-election through a ‘popular survey’, and allying his government with the arch-villains of the region, Cuba and Venezuela.

 

Some critical analysis and context for the situation in Honduras:

Firstly, in the region there are several governments with shaky claims to democracy and the rule of law – Mexico, where it has been conveniently forgotten, the second major electoral fraud in 20 years was carried out in 2006. A series of irregularities led to the right-wing candidate winning by 0.64%, hundreds of thousands demonstrated on the streets, and an alternative government existed for a while, but the international media was at the time obsessing about the ‘orange revolution’ in Ukraine, and this outrageous fraud conveniently passed into history. Colombia, where Alvaro Uribe, at the head of a regime that has seen thousands of politically motivated murders and disappearances, has also been making efforts to alter the constitution to allow his own re-election, partly motivated by fears of a Fujimori-esque end to his political career. In Costa Rica, President Oscar Arias was himself only re-elected after the constitutional court ruled void the legislation outlawing re-election, in rather murky circumstances. In Peru, Alan Garcia has just overseen the brutal repression of indigenous demonstrations, which have seen him add at least 100 lives to his already macabre CV. Surely Zelaya’s sins pale in comparison?

 

His main crime appears to have been the non-binding vote on the constituent assembly, which has been used as the pretext for the coup. This vote, if it won, would have opened the path to calling a constituent assembly, which could not have been held before Zelaya had already left office, given that his term finishes in November. Thus any re-election would take place in at least 4 years time, hardly the mark of a megalomaniac. The real desire for the constituent assembly came from the need to reform a constitution that was written in the shadow of military dictatorship, and thus blocked significant social reforms.

 

The policies he began to carry out were part of his promises to bring economic growth and change. This programme was stymied when the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the US government offered only moderate sums of aid in response to Zelaya’s appeal, sums which were doubled by ALBA. ALBA further guaranteed Honduran fuel supplies for the next decades, allowing a measure of long-term economic stability. This turn to ALBA, was followed by assistance in social programmes and by an increasing political alignment with the ALBA countries. This alliance was further bolstered by the economic failure of the 2006 FTA signed with the US, which has seen the Honduran exports dwarfed by imports causing rising unemployment, especially in agriculture, as NAFTA did in Mexico. The poverty gap has widened, and it is this that President Zelaya was trying to tackle, by adopting measures that threatened the future of the FTA.

 

Here we have the clues for the curious involvement of the US in this crisis. Honduras under Zelaya became an ally of the ALBA, and thus a political enemy of US pushed neo-liberal economic policies, which coincidentally took the world into the current economic crisis. He also threatened US economic interests, since joining ALBA was incompatible with any FTA.

 

What is the evidence of US involvement? Well, the US government has admitted that representatives were in talks with the plotters for a week before it took place, ‘trying to find another way’ out of the situation. Furthermore, the appearance of several people linked to past and present administrations points towards a deeper involvement.

 

Just in the month before the coup a civic democratic forum was formed from a variety of Honduran ‘civil society’ organisations, many of which received funds from the $50 million dollars that USAID and the nefarious Reagan-founded NED distribute each year. Just this year the International Republican Institute, part of the NED, received 1.2 million dollars to use in Honduras. This Civic Democratic Forum immediately declared that the coup had ‘saved democracy’ in Honduras. This recipe is similar to that followed in ‘colour revolutions’ in Eastern Europe and to the functions of opposition groups in Venezuela and Bolivia.

 

Furthermore, a series of the State Department actors in this crisis have links to US policy areas characterised by overt and covert hostility. The current US ambassador, Hugo Llorens - a Cuban exile - was formerly in charge of the Andean Affairs section of the NSC, and as such, was reporting to Otto Reich and Bush during the 2002 coup against Chavez in Venezuela. He joins a series of other ambassadorial appointments in Central America, which include people linked to US Intelligence (Nicaragua), the campaign against Cuba (El Salvador), and support of the Venezuelan opposition (Guatemala). There is also a strong pro-putchist lobby in the US, headed by John McCain and the Cormac Group, which brought a delegation from the junta to Washington to meet Congressmen and Senators.

 

Lastly there is a military element to this crisis. The Honduran constitution does not allow foreign bases on national soil, and yet the US has had an installation in Soto Cano since the 1950s, headquarters of Joint Task Force-B, which has about 500 men and several aircraft at its disposal. Zelaya, incidentally, had decided to open the airport to civilian air traffic, which would seriously affect the bases military functions. Then there are the large numbers of officers trained in the School of the Americas and its successors, with two of the putschist generals having attended the School.

 

All of this points towards a more active US role in events in Honduras than has been recognised in the English speaking media, and also helps explain the US inaction over the coup. Although there have been references to the coup, and to the ‘restitution of constitutional order’ there has been no official characteristation of the coup as such, as this would necessitate the immediate cutting of military and economic aid to Honduras, and beginning active measures against the putschists.

 

What next?

For the putschists, the future to a large extent depends on the US attitude towards their government. If economic sanctions are applied, it will rapidly force them to step down. They also face significant social mobilisation, which they cannot respond to with overwhelming force, without forcing the US government’s hand. However, without using force, the social mobilisation may well grow and become uncontrollable. None of its neighbours can afford to close the border for long, and the 3 day closure last week reputedly cost the region some 200 million dollars in lost revenue, but how long can the business sectors allied to the coup withstand the economic disruption being caused by road blockades and strikes?

 

Their hope must be that the regime will be able to stagger along until the elections in November. If these pass without major disruption and can be internationally verified somehow, then it is foreseeable that the US and its closest allies would be able to recognise the new government, without seeming to have backed the coup.

 

This outcome will become impossible if Zelaya manages to enter Honduras, and become the focal point for popular resistance to the coup. However, it is yet to be seen whether Zelaya has the courage to do this, considering the personal risk it entails. But a Zelaya in prison, or dead would make it nigh on impossible for the regime to claim any legitimacy, and this is why the actions of the deposed president will to a large extent determine the outcome of the crisis.

 

Monday, 29 June 2009

Crisis in Honduras: a constitutional President overthrown

The overthrow of President Jose Manuel Zelaya Rosales in Honduras has vividly raised the spectre of a continent plagued by coups de etat and dictatorships once more. The governments of Latin America have been unanimous in their condemnation of the coup, with the OAS, the Rio Group, ALBA, Mercosur and UNASUR calling for the restoration of the constitutionally elected president. The ousted President has also received the support of the Inter American Human Rights Commission, and has been invited to address the UN General Assembly ‘as soon as possible’ by its President, Miguel D’Escoto.

Some Context:

Honduras is a deeply unequal country, the richest 10% of the population take home 43.7% of the National Income, while the bottom 30% take just 7.4%. Just under 40% of the population live in poverty (defined as earning less than double the cost of the basic food basket) and only 4.7% of the population have access to the internet, which might go some way to explaining the vociferous (and largely anglophone) criticisms of President Zelaya on some websites[1].

President Zelaya was taking steps to address this inequality, a process which earned him the enmity of much of Congress. He also pursued a leftist foreign policy, joining the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) and bringing in Cuban doctors to provide healthcare to the poorest sectors of Honduran society. This has undoubtedly caused significant discomfort among some in Washington, especially at a time when much of Latin America has seemed to move beyond the reach of US political power. It also caused outrage among the Honduran elite, who have become increasingly hostile to President Zelaya.

The catalyst for the assault on the Presidential home by the armed forces, and the subsequent detention and expulsion of the President from the country was the vote that was due to take place yesterday (Sunday 28th June) upon whether a referendum ought to be held, alongside the Presidential election ballot in November 2010, which is when Zelaya’s term officially ends, on the convocation of a constituent assembly, . In other words, the coup was sparked by a non-binding vote which asked the population whether or not they wanted to be asked about a constitutional reform.

The coup was officially called for by the Honduran Supreme Court, although this is highly misleading as the Supreme Court in Honduras has no legislative function, rather being the equivalent of an electoral tribunal which governs the electoral process. It is not the highest instance of the Judicial branch, and it is indicative of the state of much reporting on the crisis that this has as yet not been picked up on.

This is merely the first of several lies and misleading statements being issued by the de facto government. Prime among them being that the coup is in fact a ‘constitutional transfer of power’ as if this is possible when the President’s home is assaulted by the military, the President himself bundled into a military aircraft in his pyjamas and flown into exile, with his Ministers detained and beaten alongside the ambassadors of Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela. Secondly, the illegally installed ‘president’, Roberto Micheletti has declared that “80 or 90 percent of the population support what happened today”, this is highly doubtful given his declaration of a curfew, the ongoing demonstrations, road blockades in the west of the country, and the general strike called for by social organisations and the trade union movement. However, Micheletti has unsurprisingly received expressions of support from the Honduran business sector. It remains to be seen whether the Honduran military will be prepared to shed the blood of civilians to protect an illegal government with no international backing.

Although there is little direct evidence of US interference in the coup, Eva Golinger has indicated certain similarities between the coup attempt against Chavez in 2002 and the current situation in Honduras. She points out that a New York Times article states that the US government was working for “several days” with the coup planners in order to 'prevent' the coup. Surely, it would seem naïve not to believe that if the US government had expressed their firm opposition to the coup, it would never have occurred.

Regardless of the extent of US involvement in, or support for the coup, it is undoubtedly a litmus test for President Obama’s policy towards the region. With such universal condemnation of the coup, if the US does not act to support the reinstatement of President Zelaya it will cause profound harm to its relationship with Latin America as a whole, as well as further eroding what little ‘soft power’ the US retains in the region, and send a powerful message about the truthfulness of US rhetoric on liberty, democracy and the right to self determination.


 



[1] Figures from 2007, source: ECLAC Annual Report 2008

Tuesday, 28 April 2009

Snapshots of Obama’s First 100 Days: A French Spring in Washington?

When Barack Obama fielded questions from an adoring French audience in Strasbourg earlier this month, he pleased his hosts by singling out a shining example of European ingenuity in public transportation – the high-speed rail system. The president disclosed his envy for high-speed trains to the audience, and it should not be taken lightly when American presidents get envious. Just two weeks later in Washington Obama actively campaigned for a similar network in the United States and committed $8 billion for good measure.

Riders of the TGV rejoiced at high velocity, no doubt. Six years ago, seldom were heard any encouraging words for all things French. Claims of France’s relegation to the “old Europe” highlighted the opinion that America could replace Paris with Prague and Berlin with Budapest. The election of the progressive Obama has seen off that argument. In a strange twist of fate that would make Donald Rumsfeld smolder, we see a lot more of France in American public policies these days.

Looking at the ambitious agenda laid out in these lively first 100 days, the social democratic tendencies are remarkable. In response to the ongoing financial crisis, the Obama administration is considering deals to secure a large ownership stake in 19 of America’s largest banks. Speculation rose this week that it would seize a majority stake in the nation’s largest automobile manufacturer, General Motors. The stimulus bill passed in February includes $27 billion devoted to transportation infrastructure, in addition to the money set aside for high-speed rail. And then there’s health care component: $634 billion in the administration’s proposed budget to serve as a “down payment” for overhauling the fragmented and ineffective private system into a public-private entity, aimed at driving down costs and providing universal coverage.

You would think a merry band of French social democrats decamped from the rive gauche to infiltrate the Washington area (although surely not on the Potomac’s own left bank, Virginia). To make sure the parallels did not get out of hand, the Brookings Institution convened a panel asking the now mind-blowing question: “Is America the New France?” Senior Fellow and moderator Justin Vaisse quickly pointed out that if the United Sates was indeed turning into France, the journey to New York would take a mere 90 minutes, all citizens would enjoy health coverage, eighty per cent of homes would be powered by nuclear energy, and the food of far higher quality. Clive Crook, the chief Washington columnist with the Financial Times, opined that while the differences are narrowing, Americans and the French still retain vastly different views of the individual’s relationship to the state and of what one should expect of his government. Brookings Senior Fellow William Galston underscored this point with compelling data from a recent OECD survey: French public spending is 15 per cent higher than in the United States. This translates into France boasting half the poverty rate of America and 25 per cent less inequality between the rich and the poor. France also offers twice the amount of benefits to its unemployed, which recently rose to 8.2 per cent.

Overall, the panel concluded, embracing French public policies can yield only limited benefits for Americans. The overriding concern is that the American government, in the absence of a viable and coherent opposition, will exert too much control over its citizens - a decidedly transformative prospect, and not one for the better. All agreed that over-indulging in the American social democratic experiment would be detrimental to the American self-image as independent, self-determined, and hard-working. As for the upgrade in gastronomy, the American appetite will surely abide without any qualms whatsoever.